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Abstract
Much of what we recognize as contemporary administrative law emerged during the 
1920s and 1930s, a period when a group of legal academics attempted to aid Progressive Era and 
New Deal regulatory efforts by crafting a legitimating system for the federal administrative state.  
Their system assigned competent, expert institutions—most notably administrative agencies and 
the judiciary—well-defined roles: Agencies would utilize their vast, specialized knowledge and 
abilities to correct market failures, while courts would provide a limited but crucial oversight of 
agency operations.  This Article focuses both on this first generation of administrative law 
scholarship, which included most prominently Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, and on the 
contemporaneous challenge to their work raised by the legal realist Thurman Arnold.  Arnold 
characterized early modern administrative law as a quasi-formalist effort to impose a logical 
system of procedure and judicial review on what he saw as pragmatic, functional regulatory 
agencies that were attempting to address the crisis of the Depression.  Although he conceded the 
persuasive power of this logical system, Arnold predicted that its requirements, especially for 
adversarial litigation and judicial review, would ultimately impede the optimal operations of a 
modern administrative state.  Although Arnold’s eclectic alternative proposals had no influence, 
his predictions and critique remain incisive and relevant to an academic field and body of 
doctrine that regularly face regular bouts of intellectual and political crisis.
The Article carries the historical disagreement between Arnold and his contemporaries 
into the present by connecting their debates first to the development of legal process theory as an 
approach to federal courts and constitutional law in the 1950s and then to similar debates in 
administrative law today.  Arnold’s challenge to early modern administrative law, the Article 
argues, remains relevant because American law still demands a systemic, legalistic conception of 
the administrative state.  A logical system of administrative and legal process has enormous 
symbolic power even though, as its current detractors note, it often produces suboptimal 
regulatory practices.  The recurring conflict between an enormously durable system and its 
critique, a conflict that continues to drive administrative law scholarship, began in the 1920s and 
1930s; any efforts to reform the field should understand the terms and implications of the 
conflict’s foundations.
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4Huge treatises are now appearing showing the compatibility of administrative 
justice with the law.  Just as theology was not able to exist without a Redeemer, 
so the “law” must have its equity or its administrative law in order to save 
mankind from the consequences of its logical systems.
-  Thurman Arnold (1935)1
Since their origins in the Depression, the practice, teaching, and study of modern 
administrative law have continued to develop in the midst of debates over how to resolve 
conflicts between a dominant set of legal doctrines and external political demands.  Over the past 
half-century or more, periodic administrative legitimacy crises have spawned an academic 
literature consisting of authoritative, influential articles that clarify embryonic doctrines and 
theories.2  The now-familiar rhythm of such outbursts began with modern administrative law’s 
widespread emergence in the 1930s, when federal regulatory agencies became sufficiently 
prevalent to warrant extensive attention from legal academics.3  Administrative law histories 
have established this fairly well-known story:  Academics sympathetic to the Roosevelt 
Administration, including most prominently Felix Frankfurter and the young professors who had 
taken his classes at Harvard Law School, provided the theoretical and doctrinal bases for the 
Administration’s efforts to address the vast market failures wrought by the Depression.4  In 
doing so, this first generation of scholars launched administrative law as a basic part of the law 
1 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 64 (1935)[hereinafter SYMBOLS].
2 The period of greatest ferment was the mid-1970s, when three influential critiques of administrative law 
appeared: James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); 
Robert Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 NW. U. L. 
REV. 120 (1977)[hereinafter Transition]; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1668 (1975)[hereinafter Reformation].  This ferment was neither unprecedented, see HENRY 
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962), 
nor the last word, see CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY (1990); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 545-49 
(2000).
3 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1252-53 
(1986)[hereinafter Historical Perspectives].
5school curriculum and a popular subject of academic legal research.  More important, they put in 
place a particular ideological and conceptual approach to the subject, one that continues to shape 
the theory and practice of administrative law today.5  For first generation administrative law 
scholars, the correct legal and administrative processes and structure would lead inexorably to 
superior law and policies.  Their presumptions about both the peculiar competencies of 
administrative agencies and the limited but still important role of the judicial review of agency 
action continue to underpin the conceptual and doctrinal dimensions of the field.
These scholars faced opposition in their own time, most famously from elite members of 
the legal community who—seeking to protect their clients, their status and business, and/or their 
legal culture—sought to challenge the political and legal legitimacy of new and expanded federal 
regulatory programs.6  But they also faced a critique from an unlikely source within the legal 
academy:  Thurman Arnold, a member of the Yale Law School faculty associated with the legal 
realists.7  Like the first generation of administrative law scholars, Arnold was an advocate of 
federal regulation and especially of the New Deal, but unlike his contemporaries at Harvard, he 
was deeply suspicious of comprehensive solutions based upon structural and procedural systems.  
His brief but evocative writings on the subject represent a singular effort to bring realism’s 
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:  PROBLEMS, 
TEXT, AND CASES 21-24 (5th ed. 2002); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 103-08, 114-
16 (2000)[hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
5 See WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1982); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 213-25 (1992); WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 103-08; Thomas O. Sargentich, Teaching 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 1 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 147, 150-54 (1992); Stewart, Reformation, 
supra note 2, at 1677-78.
6 See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); George 
B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1557, 1571-72 (1996); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative 
Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
7 The best current source of biographical information on Arnold is Gene M. Gressley, Introduction, in
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 1 (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977)[hereinafter 
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY].  A full-length biography by Spencer Webber Waller is forthcoming from NYU Press.
6insights to the judicial review of federal administrative agencies.8  Arnold argued that society is 
shaped by a deep-seated desire for stable and authoritative legal and political symbols, and he 
proposed an eclectic mix of creative means to enable the growth of an administrative state, one 
that would be sufficiently free of legal constraints to attack what he considered the root causes of 
the Depression.  
Both early proponents of the federal administrative state and their critics shared the 
assumption that the “supremacy of law” undergirding a liberal democracy required the judiciary 
and administrative agencies to operate within separate but interdependent spheres—even if they 
disagreed as to whether the judiciary’s role was to uphold or strike down agency decisions.9  By 
contrast, Arnold called for abandoning the separate domains of agency regulation and judicial 
review in favor of more functional, flexible relationships between courts and agencies, 
relationships that would include both institutional partnerships and greater agency independence.  
This departure from the consensus of his day reflected Arnold’s commitment to two of realism’s 
core tendencies: a deep-rooted distrust of formal distinctions and a restless quest for practical 
solutions to the functional impasses caused by unreflective formalist assumptions.  The solutions 
Arnold proposed to the inefficiencies and irrationalities caused by judicial review were thus both 
critical and reconstructive, and opposed the formalities of legal system-building.10
8 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:  MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS 11-14 (1983) 
[hereinafter BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE].
9 The popular notion of “judicial supremacy,” which presumes the judiciary’s authority to provide a final 
review of legal and especially constitutional questions, became prominent during the 1890s with the early stirrings 
of the administrative state, and was tied during that time to classical legal formalism and laissez faire ideology.  See
ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 253 (1992); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 152-53 (1982); 
William E. Nelson, Commentary, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional 
Theory in the States: 1790- 1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1182-85 (1972); cf. Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficult, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 339-42 (1998) 
(placing the term’s earliest rise in popularity in the early and mid-nineteenth century).
10 This anti-systemic tendency extended to sarcastic criticism of the American Law Institute’s common law 
restatement project.  See Thurman W. Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800 
(1931).
7Arnold resisted what he termed the “logical system” of administrative law, with its 
acceptance of a central role for judicial review, even as he recognized the judiciary as a 
necessary, if merely symbolic and ideological, component of the modern administrative state. 
Like the first generation scholars and their critics, he too saw the inevitability of law’s 
institutional “supremacy,” but assumed that any effort to retain judicial review would inevitably 
sink agency discretion.  In the “trial by combat” of litigation, courts would always emerge the 
symbolic superior to any party appearing before them, whether individual, agency, or 
Congress.11  The only way to protect fledgling administrative agencies, therefore, was to avoid 
the combat in any way possible.
Arnold’s proposed alternatives to trial by combat were dead on arrival and his critique of 
administrative law has largely been ignored, even as his anti-formalist criticism has remained 
current and popular.12  But his work was more than an historical anomaly.  It was prophetic.  He 
saw that the emerging approach advocated by his contemporaries featured a comprehensive, 
formal system that would successfully utilize prevailing symbols to legitimate administrative 
agencies.  He also correctly predicted the costs of creating a formal structure that would 
ultimately limit administrative discretion and regulatory flexibility.  Equally significant, his work 
illuminates two fundamental, related, and relatively unexplored aspects of the past and present of 
administrative law, aspects which in turn explain the cyclical tendencies of scholars in the field 
to find crisis and resolution in its familiar and flexible structures.
First, his critique and the debate it sparked between himself and Felix Frankfurter starkly 
reveals modern administrative law’s procedural core and its precursor relationship to the legal 
11 Thurman Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1934) [hereinafter Trial by 
Combat].
12 See Mark Fenster, The Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1053, 1056-57 (2003).
8process theory that would become, in the post-war period, the dominant post-realist approach to 
legal scholarship and teaching.  Arnold rejected any fundamental or functional distinctions 
between the judiciary and agencies as institutions of governance except insofar as they served the 
symbolic dimensions of governance.  He also showed little faith in process as a necessary and 
sufficient means to a functional administrative state.  Rather, he saw procedural doctrines in the 
same way that a wily, creative attorney does:  as a tool to move a decisionmaker to a desired 
outcome.  Process, form, and structure were secondary to substantive policy and functional 
results.  It was in response to Arnold, as well as to opponents of the New Deal expansion of the 
regulatory state, that first generation scholars began to articulate the concepts of process-centered 
jurisprudence, of limited, reasoned judicial review, and of institutional competencies—concepts 
now associated with legal process theory—as justifications both for the rise of administrative 
agencies and for the continuing (though limited) importance of judicial review of agency action.  
Juxtaposing the first generation scholars’ work to Arnold’s critique, then, makes plain the core 
commitments of modern administrative law—both in the moment at which they emerged and in 
the later appearance and success of legal process theory.  In this light, administrative law appears 
less a realist effort to create a pragmatic, problem-solving legal regime and academic discipline, 
and more a traditional effort to apply recognizable, comprehensive, formal legal structures and 
methods to an emergent area of law and government. 
Second, reinserting Arnold’s critique into the historical trajectory of administrative law 
enables a better understanding of how the first generation scholars set in motion a systematic 
approach that is sufficiently abstract, flexible, comprehensive, and familiar to have contained the 
political and conceptual challenges to the administrative state that have unfolded over the past 
fifty years.  Although first generation scholars recognized the dangers of judicial review for 
9administrative agencies—this debate took place, after all, at the height of the controversy 
surrounding the Supreme Court’s finding some New Deal regulatory programs 
unconstitutional—they advocated a system based on the judiciary’s ultimate supremacy over 
agency competence in developing expert policy.  Like the first generation, succeeding 
generations of administrative law scholars have identified particular crises of legitimacy, 
governance, and functionality in regulatory agencies, and have posited new models of judicial 
and administrative processes that can better serve the needs of their times.  Though certainly not 
without merit or beneficial effects, such efforts have typically offered to resolve the external 
crises they identify by redefining internal institutional competencies and rejiggering the relative 
authority of the judiciary and the internal procedures of administrative agencies.  Such reforms 
reaffirm an earlier faith in a structural solution to the challenge of the regulatory state, one based 
upon administrative and legal process and overseen ultimately by the judiciary.  To break this 
conceptual log jam and remake the field of administrative law, more recent scholarship has 
sought to change the first generation’s model, often borrowing methods and theories offered by 
other academic disciplines.  In doing so, this scholarship has taken up, unknowingly, Arnold’s 
original challenge, and faces the same conceptual impasse and settled institutions and doctrines 
as Arnold faced, as further calcified by the field’s long history.
To illuminate the comparison between Arnold and the consensus on administrative law 
that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, the Article begins in Part I of this Article presents first 
generation scholars’ successful efforts to legitimate a vision of agency expertise and judicial 
review.  Part II turns to Arnold’s competing vision of administrative law, first summarizing the 
broad themes of his approach to law and governance, and then focusing on his critique of 
conventional notions of judicial review within administrative law and his various proposals for a 
less formal and more flexible approach.  Part III discusses the first generation scholars’ debate 
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with Arnold in correspondence and published scholarship, a debate that illuminates what both 
sides saw as the stakes of their proposed visions of modern administrative law.  Parts IV and V 
consider the implications of this debate for the historiography of administrative law as a field of 
legal academic endeavor.  Part IV demonstrates the conceptual connections between first 
generation scholarship and the legal process theory that emerged in the post- war period, and 
recounts Arnold’s intervention in 1960 against what he saw as legal process advocates’ 
conservative formalism—an intervention in which he revisited the arguments he initially made as 
modern administrative law emerged.  Part V considers the continuities between first generation 
scholarship and more recent administrative law scholarship, as well as between Arnold’s dissent 
and current critiques of the field.
I.
An Administrative and Judicial Process:
First Generation Administrative Law Scholarship
At the height of legal realism, administrative law was a nascent academic enterprise, as 
well as an embryonic practice area of federal law.13  Significant federal statutory mandates for 
regulatory programs whose implementation was overseen by administrative agencies (as well as 
myriad state regulatory agencies overseeing state programs) had been in place since the Populist 
and Progressive Eras.  Despite this fact, the modern federal administrative state—envisioned as a 
response to and check upon market failure—did not begin in earnest until the early New Deal.14
Unsurprisingly, then, as late as 1937, only a bare majority of accredited law schools offered one 
or more courses in administrative law.15  And even though numerous important agencies, 
including the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, had fully 
13 See A.H. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647 (1938).
14 See Rabin, Historical Perspective, supra note 3, at 1243-53.
15 See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public, 23 AM. BAR. ASSN. J. 871, 874 (1937).
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established themselves by the time of the New Deal,16 the Roosevelt Administration faced 
enormous resistance from elite segments of the legal profession as it attempted to expand the 
number and scope of the federal regulatory bureaucracy.17  Attorneys and jurists increasingly 
accepted federal administrative agencies as essential elements of American governance during 
the early part of the twentieth century, despite their apparently anomalous position within 
traditional, formalist conceptions of the constitutional order.  But the acceptance was grudging, 
and the legal legitimacy of the administrative state and its operations remained the subject of 
vigorous debate.18
A. Precursors to the First Generation.
Legal academics in the early twentieth century had developed a number of competing 
approaches to the emerging field.  All shared the general commitment of the Progressive Era to 
address large scale economic and social issues through legislative regulatory programs 
administered by government bureaucracies rather than through common law causes of action 
adjudicated by courts.  Writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1936, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
described this shift as “a substitution made necessary, not by want of an applicable law, but 
because the ever-expanding activities of government in dealing with the complexities of modern 
life had made indispensable the adoption of procedures more expeditious and better guided by 
specialized experience than any which the courts had provided.”19
16 See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (establishing Interstate Commerce Commission); Act of Sept. 26, 
1914, 38 Stat. 717 (establishing Federal Trade Commission).  See generally WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 
98-103 (describing how administrative agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission had grown in power 
and achieved some measure of popular and judicial acceptance during the early part of the twentieth century).
17 See sources cited supra note 6. 
18 See WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 96-108.
19 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1936).  On Progressive 
Era political commitments and their relationship to academics studying government and administrative law, see
JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 361-63, 383-85 (1986); William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern 
American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
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The least important of these approaches within law schools was that associated with 
Frank Goodnow of Columbia University’s Law School and Government department, a leading 
Progressive advocate of administrative agencies, and teacher of the first administrative law 
course taught in a law school.20  Goodnow’s legal scholarship sought to enable regulatory bodies 
to operate free of the narrow constitutional constraints that courts used to limit congressional 
legislation and delegation.21  His approach was largely an internal one that studied how 
administrative officers applied and executed statutes, and focused less on common law 
development by the judiciary, which was the traditional focus of the legal academy.22  Goodnow 
ultimately became better known as a founder of the academic discipline Political Science (or 
Government) and for developing the empirical study of government institutions.23
A second approach that was more cognizable and much better-known within the legal 
academia of the 1920s and 1930s was that of Ernst Freund.  Like Goodnow, Freund had worked 
in law schools and political science departments, and had also served in government agencies.24
Freund also shared with Goodnow a commitment to Progressive politics, and called both for 
increased governmental reliance on technical, scientific professionals to make expert 
20 See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991); Novak, supra note 19, at 249;  
Richard M. Thomas, Deprofessionalization and the Postmodern State of Administrative Law Pedagogy, 42 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 75, 75 n.6 (1992). 
21 See Novak, supra note 19, at 258, 271-72.
22 Goodnow’s most significant treatise on administrative law was intended for students of “politics.”  FRANK 
J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, at iv (1905).  The treatise 
spent only the first of its six “books,” and part of another, and less than a third of its pages, on specifically legal 
issues, concentrating instead on the forms and practices of administration and the work of administrative officers.  
See also John A. Fairlie, Public Administration and Administrative Law, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW 3, 28-30 (Charles G. 
Haines & Marshall E. Dimock eds., 1935) (contrasting Goodnow’s approach to the more legal approaches of Ernst 
Freund, Bruce Wyman, and others within legal academia).
23 See JAMES HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-5 (1940); Introduction: Frank J. 
Goodnow, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION supra note 22, at v, x.
24 See OSCAR KRAINES, THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND 2-8 (1974).  An illustration of Goodnow’s 
distance from the traditional legal academy is the apocryphal tale of Thomas Reed Powell, who described the 
experience of studying under Goodnow in the early years of the twentieth century after having attended Harvard 
Law School, as one in which he had been “de-Harvardized.”  LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60,
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administrative decisions divorced from the corruption of politics, and for a field of administrative 
law to legitimate and assist in the “legislative regulation of economic activity.”25  He explicitly 
encouraged legal academics to study administrative agencies and to assist them in discerning 
their broad legislative mandates.26
Freund focused especially on systems of public administration, on the specific powers 
(such as licensing and ratemaking) that public officers and agencies wielded, and on statutory 
and common law bases for judicial review of administrative action.27  The latter constituted a 
“strictly legal discipline” and had become the subject matter of the legal academy; public 
administration, by contrast, was an extra-legal realm considered by professors of Government 
and Political Science.28  In this regard, he sought to bridge what he described as the differentiated 
study of administrative organization and administrative powers, the former of which focused on 
optimizing internal public administration and the latter of which performed the “more strictly 
legal” task of protecting “right and justice” through external judicial institutions.29  In his 
instruction on the internal functions of administration, Freund’s work focused students’ attention 
on the workaday world of government officials and attorneys, and served the traditional role of 
introducing “the rank and file of the bar-to-be to methods of legal thinking, to the fundamental 
at 50 (1986)[hereinafter LEGAL REALISM].  On the importance of Freund’s and Goodnow’s work to the development 
of a pre-New Deal public law, see Novak, supra note 19, at 255.
25 Ernst Freund, Historical Survey, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 20 (Ernst Freund 
et al. eds., 1923)(hereinafter Historical Survey).  Freund’s approach itself had its precedents; treatise author and state 
supreme court justice Thomas Cooley, for example, was a nineteenth century precursor of Freund.  See Paul D. 
Carrington, Law and Economics in the Creation of Federal Administrative Law: Thomas Cooley, Elder to the 
Republic, 83 IOWA L. REV. 363, 387- 88 (1998).
26 Freund, Historical Survey, supra note 25, at 39; Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher degrees 
in Graduate Schools and Law Schools, 11 ILL. L. REV. 308 (1916).
27 See Oliver O. Field, The Study of Administrative Law: A Review and a Proposal, 18 IOWA L. REV. 233, 
234-35 (1933).
28 Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 452, 455 (Edwin R. A. 
Seligman ed., 1932).
29 Id.
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rules, to the elements of procedure.”30  This approach remained an important one to the legal 
academy and to the bar, as faculty focused on the vocational aspects of administrative law 
through the case method,31 and as leading members of the bar called for greater attention in law 
teaching to “the principles and methods of procedure in administrative law cases” within 
agencies.32
In his more traditional legal academic work, Freund presented a curiously conservative 
approach for a committed Progressive.33  His early casebook on administrative law used case-
based training methods to emphasize the various common law means by which individuals could 
seek relief from judicial action.34  But his understanding of the constitutional and legislative 
limits of administrative agencies was quite constrained.  To Freund, legislatures strictly limited 
agency discretion within a statutory framework, and any agency efforts to regulate beyond its 
statutory mandate that affected individual liberty or property rights was “hardly conformable to 
the ‘Rule of Law.’”35 At the same time, he considered it appropriate for legislatures to delegate 
authority only to agencies that concerned uncontroverted issues of policy or opinion.36  In the 
30 See Maurice H. Merrill, Three Possible Approaches to the Study of Administrative Law, 18 IOWA L. REV.
228, 232 (1932)[hereinafter Approaches].
31 See Field, supra note 27, at 235; Paul L. Sayre, A Common Law of Administrative Powers, 18 IOWA L. 
REV. 241, 247 (1933).  After Freund’s death, his successor at the University of Chicago, Kenneth Sears, published a 
similar casebook that provided a remedy-based, functional approach and limited consideration of the larger 
constitutional issues on which Frankfurter and Davison’s casebook focused.  See KENNETH C. SEARS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at vii-viii (1938).
32 See O. R. McGuire, Reforms Needed in the Teaching of Administrative Law, 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 171, 
176-78 (1937).  During this period, McGuire was chairman of the ABA’s Special Committee on Administrative Law 
that was developing a proposal for a specialized administrative court to hear appeals from agency adjudications.  See
Daniel R. Ernst, Dicey’s Disciple on the D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative Law Reform, 
1933-1940, 90 GEO. L.J. 787, 790 -93 (2002).
33 Freund’s commitment to Progressivism was real but cautious.  See KRAINES, supra note 24, at 93 -94.
34 See Merrill, Approaches, supra note 30, at 228; Fairlie, supra note 22, at 28 -29.
35 Freund, Historical Survey, supra note 25, at 22 -23; see also Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for 
Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 666, 670 (1915) (“[F]or in a government by law discretion ought to 
have a very limited place in administration.”).  Freund’s position was subject to vigorous criticism from, among 
others, Dean John Wigmore of Northwestern.  See generally John H. Wigmore, The Dangers of Administrative 
Discretion, 19 ILL. L. REV. 440, 441 (1925) (arguing for control rather than reduction of administrative discretion).
36 See ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 218-221 (1928).
15
absence of such consensus, Freund argued, legislatures should control private activity directly by 
statute, without administrative enforcement.37
B. The First Generation.
The approach that was beginning to dominate legal academia during the early twentieth 
century, established at Harvard in the century’s first decade, opposed both Freund’s narrow 
vision of administrative discretion and his focus on the judicial review of statutory and common 
law issues.38  Harvard Law School dean Roscoe Pound and professors Bruce Wyman and 
Thomas Reed Powell in the first quarter of the century,39 and, later and more clearly, Harvard 
professor Felix Frankfurter and his students (most prominently James Landis—himself later dean 
of Harvard) were the leading legal academic theorists who helped develop the most influential 
modern conception of administrative law.40  To varying extents, and with Frankfurter and Landis 
37 See ibid.
38 See WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 107.  Cf. CHASE, supra note 5 (alleging that Frankfurter, with 
the help of his students, purposefully subverted Freund’s approach and, to an extent, his career).  
39 See BRUCE WYMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1903); Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 46 
AM. L. REG. 144 (1907); Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 WISC. L. REV. 321 (1924)[hereinafter 
Pound, Growth]; Thomas Reed Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power [Parts I and II], 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 268 & 333 (1910).  Pound would later adamantly oppose the New Deal and administrative discretion, and 
single out first generation scholars for withering, often excessive criticism. See Paul Verkuil, The Emerging 
Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 268-71 (1978).
40 See Sayre, supra note 31, at 241 -42 (describing Frankfurter’s influence on the then-present generation of
legal academics teaching and writing on administrative law).  On Frankfurter’s teaching at Harvard, which 
concentrated on public law subjects like administrative law and public utilities as well as federal jurisdiction, see
Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter at Harvard, in 1 FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 137, 140-43 (Wallace 
Mendelson ed., 1964).  On Frankfurter’s “old boy network,” through which he placed his best students in the right 
clerkships and prepared them for careers in elite academic or government positions, see G. EDWARD WHITE, Felix 
Frankfurter, The Old Boy Network, and the New Deal, in INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 149 (1994). 
Some have argued that Frankfurter was a minor administrative law scholar whose great achievement was in 
acting as a mentor to others.  See CHASE, supra note 5, at 137-39; Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, 
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 540-41 (2002).  It seems a 
curious reflection of academic priorities to call someone a minor scholar in the field when they train a generation of 
scholars, lawyers, and officials in a particular approach that they retained throughout their entire illustrious academic 
and public careers.  Frankfurter himself considered his administrative law teaching to be among his most important 
tasks as an academic, and he purposely limited his administrative law seminars (as well as those on federal 
jurisdiction) to elite groups of Harvard’s highest achieving students.  See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix 
Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 752 n.329 (1993).  Long into their 
distinguished academic careers, Frankfurter’s students continued to remember their mentor’s administrative law 
seminar.  See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
914, 918-19 (1966) (describing the class period after the Supreme Court’s decision in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 
22 (1932), and using his memory of that event to describe Frankfurter’s and Brandeis’s conception of a flexible 
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leading the way, the first generation scholars of the late 1920s and 1930s shared strong 
commitments to the idea that a powerful national administrative state led by experts was 
necessary to solve the most important political issues of the day.  These experts would engage in 
a “systematic effort” to expand “the area of accredited knowledge as the basis of action” in the 
“intricate and technical facts” of a modern economy and society.41  “Regulation by government,” 
according to John Dickinson, a former Frankfurter student, would promptly prevent future public 
harms caused by the inadequacies, failures, and collapse of the market by granting discretionary 
power to government agencies with “technical knowledge” unavailable to courts.42
Ultimately, the emergent approach of first generation administrative law scholarship 
emanated from three assumptions.  First, federal administrative agencies, with their expertise, 
flexibility, and ability to consider systemic solutions to pressing national problems, were so 
necessary for a growing, modern nation that traditional constitutional understandings regarding
the separation of governmental powers must yield—at least to some extent.43  Relying on the 
same Progressive Era traditions to which Freund and Goodnow subscribed, legal academics 
sought to establish a legal environment that enabled government intervention to serve a range of 
economic and social reforms.44  Pound had proposed the development of a body of law that 
approach to administrative law).  Moreover, claiming Frankfurter had secondary status as an administrative law 
scholar requires one to ignore the relevance of Frankfurter’s extensive writings on federal jurisdiction and on the 
institutional role of the Supreme Court for the development of administrative law as a field.  As I note in Part III 
below, he certainly did not consider that work irrelevant—procedure and jurisdiction were, to him, central to making 
administrative agencies legitimate and protecting the status of the judiciary.  In his approach, a proper legal process 
was essential to a functional and legitimate administrative process.
41 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 151-51 (1930).
42 JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 14-15 
(1927).  Dickinson dedicated the book “to Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter, pathfinders of the law.”  Id. at v.
43 See WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 98-108.  Separation of powers in this context refers both to the 
notion that the tripartite branches of government each have their own sphere of permissible activity that cannot be 
broached by another, and that Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking powers to another enumerated branch of the 
government, unless a unit of government delegated by Congress to exercise its power is itself an agent of the 
Legislature.
44 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 IOWA L. REV. 149, 157-58 
(1995).
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would challenge the existing “methods of broad generalization” of constitutionally permissible 
action .45  In Frankfurter’s words, the administrative law considered by legal academics must 
offer “fluid tendencies and tentative traditions,” and must protect against “sterile generalization 
unnourished by the realities of ‘law in action.’”46  Thus only an academic with a “rigorously 
scientific temper of mind” who is “able to move freely in the world of social and economic 
facts” would be capable of understanding and helping to construct a proper approach to 
administrative law.47  Caution about “government by experts” was not entirely misplaced, 
Frankfurter wrote, but external political control and internal standards of performance developed 
by the expert professionals themselves could provide sufficient restraint.48  The law professor’s 
role in the development of modern administrative law, then, was to nurture and promote the 
constitutional doctrine necessary to free experts to perform those tasks.
Their second, and equally important, assumption was that notwithstanding the importance 
of administrative expertise, a limited judicial review should remain at the center of the process 
by which congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies and agency actions 
themselves would be deemed legal and legitimate.49  In the opening sentence of a chapter on 
“Legal Order in Fields of Disputed Social Policy” in his 1927 book Administrative Justice and 
the Supremacy of Law, John Dickinson described the essential but properly constrained role of 
the judiciary in this way:  “Judicial review for so-called error of law is crucial not only as 
keeping open the necessary opportunity for the courts to compel observance of the law as 
previously formulated, but also as the channel through which they can carry forward the process 
45 Pound, Growth, supra note 39, at 336.  
46 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 619 (1927).
47 Id. at 621.
48 FRANKFURTER, supra note 41, at 157-60.
49 See Rabin, Transition, supra note 2, at 122-23.
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of legal development.”50  For Dickinson, review of administrative action by a modern judiciary 
open to developing a common law of regulation would constitute “an instrument of the 
supremacy of law in building out new ground for the operation of general rules and principles.”51
Frankfurter agreed.52  Constitutional common law, correctly applied by right-minded judges, 
would give birth both to a properly modern administrative state and to a properly modern 
administrative law jurisprudence.  It was not the fault of the common law that some judges 
resisted the regulatory modernism preferred by an emerging generation of administrative law 
professors; rather, fault lay with those judges who improperly applied legal rules and concepts in 
new, inappropriate contexts.53  Indeed, one only need to have considered the success of existing 
agencies to see that in a modern administrative law that included judicial review as “an integral 
part of the regulatory system,” law’s supremacy was in no danger.54  Maintaining “our traditional 
system of judicial justice,” Frankfurter and Landis had argued, was of paramount importance, 
and administrative agencies must of course conform to that system.55
Third, first generation administrative law scholars presumed that legal academic research 
and teaching should focus on the traditional study of the judicial role in this process—that is, on 
the limited judicial review of administrative agencies rather than on the bureaucratic operations 
and decisionmaking of the agencies themselves.56  This approach assumed a binary between the 
50 DICKINSON, supra note 42, at 203.
51 Id. at 206. See Rabin, Transition, supra note 2, at 122-23.
52 See CHASE, supra note 5, at 14; Daniel Ernst, Williard Hurst and the Administrative State: From Williams 
to Wisconsin, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 13-14 (2000).
53 DICKINSON, supra note 42, at 216, 334.
54 I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission: An Appraisal, 46 YALE L.J. 915, 948, 950 (1937).
55 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 173-74 (Johnson Reprint ed. 1972)(1928).
56 According to William Chase, over the course of the first two decades of the century, Dean Pound had 
sought to avoid the issue of agencies’ decisionmaking, conceiving of it ultimately as a necessary evil of the 
Progressive Era that would surely disappear as it became unnecessary.  Frankfurter’s later resistance to Freund’s 
conception of administrative law in legal academia as the study and development of agency procedures was intended 
to protect the role of legal academics and jurists from encroaching upon the work and decisions of administrative 
agencies.  See CHASE, supra note 5, at 107-13.
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actual internal work of administrative agencies—which had been at least an element of Freund’s 
and Goodnow’s works—and the external law governing judicial review of the jurisdiction and 
procedures of the administrative agencies, which within the Frankfurter approach constituted the 
field of administrative law.57  Answering the question “what is administrative law?” in a 1937 
law review article, Frankfurter’s casebook co-author J. F. Davison rejected the internal approach 
as an impossible effort to classify the necessarily intuitive, experimental actions of agencies.58 At 
that time there appeared to be no logical universal system of public administration discernible by 
law faculties—or, for that matter, even by Justice Holmes, as Davison noted.59  The internal 
approach was therefore significantly less appropriate for teaching and research than the external 
one, which focused on a typical area of legal academic expertise:  the refinement of 
constitutional common law principles.60  These efforts to create a modern conception of 
administrative law assumed that courts and legal academics would avoid intervention into the 
regulatory process at least for the present until a new administrative court (akin to courts of 
equity) would be developed—which itself would not occur until regulatory procedures and 
practices had been regularized.61  Meanwhile, law schools across the country began to adopt new 
courses in administrative law that studied appellate decisions from federal and state courts of 
general jurisdiction using the case method, while the field of “public administration” arose
concurrently in Political Science departments to develop rational and apolitical expertise in 
57 See CHASE, supra note 5, at 60-67 (citing WYMAN, supra note 39).
58 See J. F. Davison, Administration and Judicial Self-Limitation, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 297-99 (1936).
59 See id. at 298 (noting Justice Holmes’s statement that administrative agencies base their decisions on “an 
intuition of experience that outruns analysis”) (quoting Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 
(1907)).
60 See Field, supra note 27; Louis L. Jaffe, The Contributions of Mr. Justice Brandeis to Administrative Law, 
18 IOWA L. REV. 213 (1933)[hereinafter Contributions].
61 CHASE, supra note 5, at 114-15.  Scholars held fast to this assumption despite efforts by Congress and the 
bar to develop an administrative court to develop expertise in, and review intensively, the decisions of regulatory 
agencies, and even to take over the agencies’ power to adjudicate controversies surrounding their work.  See 
Maxwell S. Isenburgh, Developments in Administrative Law, 1930-1940, 27 VA. L. REV. 29 (1940); Louis L. Jaffe, 
Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1939).  Leading legal academics 
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matters of policy and bureaucracy.62  Legal academia’s limited focus on judicial review at once 
protected the expertise of lawyers, law professors, and the judiciary within the familiar methods 
of teaching and scholarship established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
expressed the elite legal academy’s Progressive Era commitment to expertise by presuming that 
administrative agencies should be protected from substantive judicial review.63  As one critic of 
this approach noted, the curriculum of administrative law classes before (and, only to a slightly 
less degree, after) World War II was concerned almost exclusively with appellate judicial 
opinions reviewing administrative decisions, with little or no focus on the internal rulemaking or 
adjudicatory processes within agencies.64
The focus on external judicial review rather than internal agency operations also shaped 
the doctrinal issues upon which first generation scholars focused their attention.  Frankfurter’s 
co-authored 1932 casebook on administrative law spent more than half its pages on 
constitutional challenges to legislation and administrative action, focusing especially on issues 
related to the separation of powers and Congressional delegation of powers to agencies.65  This 
led one critic to characterize the casebook as “in effect a specialized work on constitutional 
law.”66  Freund himself criticized Frankfurter’s exceptional attention to constitutional issues—a 
priority reversing that assumed in Freund’s earlier casebook, which had focused almost entirely 
upon the statutory and especially common law doctrines that affected agencies—and commented 
skeptically upon the status that law teachers and students bestowed upon the fleeting fashion of 
resisted, and ultimately defeated such efforts in favor of mere procedural review of administrative decisions.  
CHASE, supra note 5, at 145-46.
62 CHASE, supra note 5, at 117-34.
63 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 327 (exp. ed. 1988).
64 ESTHER L. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 179-82 (1948).
65 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (1932).
66 Clark Byse, Administrative Law—Cases and Comments, 25 IOWA L. REV. 839, 839 (1940).
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“juristic performance” in the field of constitutional law.67  Later authors abandoned the 
Frankfurter casebook’s exceptional concern with constitutional issues, but nevertheless 
continued to focus on the judicial review of constitutional issues as a major, preliminary 
consideration for a course in administrative law.68
C. James Landis and The Administrative Process.
As important as Pound’s, Frankfurter’s, and Dickinson’s work was in the 1920s, James 
Landis, author of the seminal work The Administrative Process (1938) as well as Frankfurter’s 
student and co-author, was the most important theorist of administrative law in support of the 
New Deal.69  Originally delivered at Yale in the prestigious annual Storrs lectures in January 
1938 and published as a book that same year, The Administrative Process was at the time the 
most coherent, accessible, and comprehensive account of the current state of administrative law 
from the perspective of a New Deal proponent.70 Well before his Storrs lectures—which he had 
originally been invited to deliver in 1935 but which were delayed while he served as chairman of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission—Landis had earned acclaim as a leading New Deal 
administrator, and he had recently become dean at Harvard Law School.71
Landis explained that administrative agencies and the administrative legal process that 
shaped their work were a necessary outgrowth of the increasingly complex economy and society 
that modernity had engendered.  As a result of both their historic necessity and their rational 
67 Ernst Freund, Book Review, 46 HARV. L. REV. 167, 169-70 (1932) (reviewing FRANKFURTER & DAVISON, 
supra note 65).
68 See, e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (1940); see generally Byse, 
supra note 66, at 841, 846 (describing Gellhorn casebook as “a significant and distinctive contribution” and as better 
serving an upper-division law school course in administrative law than its predecessors).
69 JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).  On Frankfurter’s relationship with Landis, one of 
his favorite Harvard students, see JOSEPH P. LASH, A Brahmin of Law: A Biographical Essay, in FROM THE DIARIES 
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 3, 35-36 (1975).
70 See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS  84-85 (1980).  It remains the 
standard text that casebook authors use to demonstrate the ideas of first generation scholarship.  See, e.g., PETER H. 
SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10-14 (2d ed. 2004) (excerpting LANDIS, supra note 69); PETER 
L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27-29 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (same).
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development, “the administrative process” of agency operations and administrative law had 
already achieved “great stature” and would only grow in the future.72 Landis considered the 
administrative process to be an optimal means of promoting government oversight because 
within its parameters agencies could study an issue comprehensively in order to resolve a 
controversy as “rightly,” rather than as fairly, as possible.73 Moreover, the regulatory state was 
necessary both to distribute wealth to “ethical levels” and to maximize the total of society’s 
wealth.74  To those who would complain of the administrative state’s coercive nature in its 
efforts to maximize and distribute wealth, Landis asserted that in the state’s absence, economic, 
legal, and political coercion would be performed by uncontrollable private entities rather than by 
a democratically elected and accountable government.75  Accordingly, Congress and the 
President should create more, and more expert, administrative agencies, because only by doing 
so could government provide the “efficiency that is the desperate need.”76
In The Administrative Process, Landis dismissed as irrational those opponents of the New 
Deal who claimed the Roosevelt administration’s expansion in the number and size of federal 
agencies was unconstitutional.77 If a court faced a constitutional claim that legislation or an 
agency action violated separation of powers principles, it must recognize the constitutionality 
71 See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 62-82.
72 LANDIS, supra note 69, at 8-9.
73 Id. at 38-40.
74 Id. at 16.
75 See id. at 11 (“[T]he penalties that private management can impose possess a coercive force and effect that 
government even with its threat of incarceration cannot equal.”); see also id. (noting that the management of a large 
corporation like U.S. Steel has power not only over its employees or customers but also “either by itself or in 
combination with its contemporaries can virtually determine what policies with reference to the production and sale 
of steel we shall pursue as a nation”).  This argument echoes a central assertion of the legal realists that is most 
closely associated with Robert Hale, an economist by training and a professor at Columbia Law School from 1919-
1949.  See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW 
AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 210 (1998); Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. 
REV. 421 (1990); Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 
(1923); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
149 (1935).
76 LANDIS, supra note 69,  at 23-24.
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and necessity of both the delegation and the administrative act.  Agencies that developed 
regulatory programs or adjudicated complaints after following proper procedures should 
withstand constitutional scrutiny insofar as the administrative process sufficiently balanced the 
constitutional branches of government, and because the products of this process were far more 
important to the function of government and the preservation of political order than was the 
value of trying to preserve a static, outdated vision of “separate” powers.78  Thus, the relationship 
between agencies and Congress must be formally flexible but based on structural means of 
control.  Successful statutory delegation would provide agencies with sufficient authority to 
devise and implement proper solutions to economic and social problems, while Congress would 
retain oversight through the appropriations process.79
Reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of the administrative 
state with a mixture of respect and criticism, Landis considered the extent to which the Court 
shared his vision of agency expertise and the judicial role of validating proper administrative 
processes and decisionmaking.  Landis praised the Court’s recent decision in Humphrey’s 
Executor, which upheld Congressional constraints on the President’s power to remove officers of 
independent agencies,80 because the decision demonstrated that the Court was coming to the 
mature realization that agencies needed and deserved sufficient “administrative freedom of 
movement” through discretion and independence.81  At the same time (and for the same reasons), 
Landis decried the Court’s holding that agency findings of “jurisdictional” facts, the existence of 
which serve as “a condition precedent to the operation of a statutory scheme,”82 and 
77 See, e.g., id. at 4 (describing the critical “literature” regarding the administrative process as “abound[ing] 
with fulmination”).
78 Id. at 46.
79 See id. at 75-78.
80 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
81 See LANDIS, supra note 69, at 115-16.
82 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 22.
24
“constitutional facts” “where rights and liberties are involved”83 deserved no judicial deference.84
By creating and enforcing this distinction to protect its institutional prerogative, Landis argued 
(referring to Justice Brandeis’s dissents in St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States and Crowell v. 
Benson), the Court invited destructive judicial intrusion into the administrative process over legal 
matters.85
In this regard, Landis shared legal realists’ faith in expertise and skepticism about 
abstract conceptions of constitutional law.  Indeed, referencing and utilizing legal realism’s 
critique of formalism, he argued that courts must look not just at precedent and legal forms but at 
“other sciences” in order to understand the “incredible areas of fact” embedded in every systemic 
business problem.86  In facts and science lay the legal necessity and legitimacy for administrative 
agencies.  The interdisciplinary and flexible expertise necessary to regulate economic behavior 
required more than a judiciary of narrow, irrelevant competencies, whose expertise limited them 
to the important task of reviewing agency solutions for fairness and reasonableness.87
83 St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
84 See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (requiring judicial exercise of court’s 
“independent judgment as to both law and facts” in review of administrative ratemaking record when the resulting 
rates are alleged to be constitutionally confiscatory); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (requiring 
independent judicial determination of the “essential jurisdictional fact” of citizenship in habeas corpus challenge to 
deportation order); Crowell, 285 U.S. at 22 (holding that the judiciary must exercise an independent judgment 
regarding the constitutional jurisdiction of a federal agency); St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 38 (holding that the 
judiciary has a duty “to exercise . . . an independent judgment upon the facts” where a constitutional violation by a 
federal agency is alleged, although it may rely on a record developed by the agency).  On the withering, but not 
death, of these doctrines in favor of an explicit deference to administrative decisions based upon substantial 
supporting evidence on the administrative record, see STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 973-78.
85 See LANDIS, supra note 69, at 132-42 (discussing St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 73 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); Crowell, 285 U.S. at 65 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
86 On Landis’s and Frankfurter’s relationship with realism, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
87 See LANDIS, supra note 69, at 30-31; see also id. at 32-34 (explaining additional advantages of regulation 
by administrative agencies to be their ability to engage in uniform, ongoing supervision of industries or disputes and 
their ability to create practical solutions based upon “all the available considerations” rather than generalized 
conclusions “drawn from the majestic authority of textbooks and cases” reached as a result of single disputes raised 
by individuals seeking to secure their rights).  Indeed, he adopted a realist tone when privileging agencies over the 
judiciary, dismissing the “lesser vision” that courts are inherently superior in all respects to administrative agencies 
because of courts’ “delphic powers,” and “affinity with deep and mysterious principles of justice that none but 
[themselves] can grasp.”  Id. at 135; see also id. at 47, 12 (describing critics’ fetishization of the number three in 
their separation of powers arguments as “numerology”); id. at 47 (dismissing formalist fears that the administrative 
process unconstitutionally threatened the separation and independence of the tri-partite government as “hysterical[ ]” 
and the result of “political conceptualization”).
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Despite his frustration with the Court’s mixed record of respecting the administrative 
process and his realist anti-formalism and faith in expertise, Landis nevertheless placed judicial 
review at the center of the administrative process.  He adopted Justice Brandeis’s declaration in 
his dissent in St. Joseph Stock Yards: “‘The supremacy of law demands that there shall be 
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and 
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly.’”88  Courts 
offered specific areas of expertise as well as constitutional authority in adjudicating certain types 
of disputes between agencies and private parties.  Judicial review could and indeed must play an 
important role in legitimating agency action that fell within agencies’ broad authority, as well as 
in checking unconstitutional congressional delegations to agencies and illegal agency behavior.  
He wrote, “The line of demarcation [between facts and law, and agencies and courts] will then 
speak in terms of reality, in terms of an appreciation of the limitations and abilities of men, rather 
than in terms of political dogma and religious abstractions.”89  The administrative process ends, 
then, with judicial review of those issues about which courts have expertise: questions of law and 
of procedure.  Courts could retain their “supremacy” over issues requiring legal expertise, while 
agencies had unreviewable authority to consider those requiring factual expertise, so long as the 
agency followed constitutionally and statutorily required procedures—which inevitably produced 
the proper application of expert knowledge.  Judicial and administrative institutions, employing 
their relative competencies, could perform their necessary constitutional and statutory duties.    
Operating in this way, law would continue to hold prestige and “grandeur” in a governing 
regime with powerful administrative agencies.  Closing The Administrative Process, Landis 
waxed rhapsodic:
88 Id. at 124 (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
89 Id. at 153.
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The power of judicial review under our traditions of government lie with the courts 
because of a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes them experts in the synthesis of 
design. . . .  The rise of the administrative process represented the hope that policies to 
shape . . . fields [of social and economic regulation] could most adequately be developed 
by men bred to the facts.  That hope is still dominant, but its possession bears no threat to 
our ideal of the “supremacy of law.”  Instead, it lifts it to new heights where the great 
judge, like a conductor of a many-tongued symphony, from what would otherwise by 
discord, makes known through the voice of many instruments the vision that has been 
given him of man’s destiny upon this earth.90
Hyperbole notwithstanding, The Administrative Process captures the confidence and mood of 
first generation scholars towards both administrative agencies and administrative law.  
Frankfurter, too, wrote confidently of this emerging consensus of administrative law, which he 
asserted constituted “the processes by which great activities of government . . . are subdued by 
the reason appropriate to them.”91  The “reason” Frankfurter and Landis advocated was 
sufficiently systemic to encompass an enclosed universe of administrative and judicial processes, 
with institutions that offered specific competencies and respected the boundaries within which 
they operated.  But it was also sufficiently open to allow, within those institutional boundaries, 
the development of expert agencies capable of solving the problems faced by the modern state, 
and careful, wise, and prudent judges capable of resolving legal and constitutional issues only 
when necessary and within their courts’ jurisdiction.
II.
Arnold’s Post-Realist Approach to Administrative Law
Like his Harvard-affiliated contemporaries, Arnold was wholly in favor of the New Deal, 
whose efforts to bring about what he celebrated as the “great productive machine with new 
energy and efficiency” required the expansion of the federal administrative state.92  He explicitly 
advocated large-scale governmental interventions into the economy as a necessary response to 
90 Id. at 154-55.
91 Felix Frankfurter, Introduction to a Symposium on Administrative Law Based Upon Legal Writings 1931-
33, 18 IOWA L. REV. 129, 130 (1933).
92 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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the economic crisis of the Depression.  He attributed the crisis to the “industrial feudalism” of 
private corporations that had caused widespread unemployment and then failed to respond to the 
plight of the legions of destitute people through the country.93  Thus, responding in 1936 to a 
query from The Nation magazine about what he expected of Roosevelt’s second term, Arnold 
predicted success for an administration “which attempts, through organizations which it creates 
or controls, to step into areas where private enterprise is unable to operate effectively.”94  But that 
success would depend, Arnold warned, upon the government’s developing practical, “efficient 
organizations”—not high falutin’ “new ideals” or a new “theory of government” about which the 
people could not care less.95  In order to facilitate the Roosevelt Administration’s development of 
such organizations free from political and legal interference, Arnold focused in his scholarly and 
more popular work on ways to limit and channel the judicial review of administrative agencies.  
In doing so, he engaged in the same general political and legal project as Frankfurter, Landis, 
and their cohorts in the first generation of administrative law scholars.
But Arnold’s approach, which appeared in a law review article and his two mid-1930s 
books, was more radical.96  For one thing, his institutional and intellectual affiliations differed 
from theirs.  He taught at Yale, having turned down a competing offer from Harvard (which he 
thought was filled with “colorless” young men97) in favor of the “exciting” times he thought 
available to him with the realists in New Haven.98  Furthermore, Frankfurter, Landis, and their 
93 Id. at 106-07.
94 Thurman Arnold, What I Expect of Roosevelt, THE NATION, Sept. 28, 1936, at 628.
95 Id.
96 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) [hereinafter FOLKLORE]; ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, 
supra note 1; Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11.
97 VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 7, at 186 (reprinting letter from Thurman Arnold to Carl Arnold, 
May 20, 1932).
98 Id. at 178 (reprinting letter from Thurman Arnold to Wilson Clough, Mar. 17, 1931).  For an account of the 
realist milieu at Yale, see KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM, supra note 24, passim; Robert W. Gordon, Professors and 
Policymakers:  Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 75, 85-
104 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004).
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Harvard-affiliated colleagues were not at the center of realism.99  Once ensconced at Yale and a 
close friend and associate of the core group of legal realists, Arnold became the rare realist-
affiliated scholar who wrote extensively on administrative law.100
More significantly, however, Arnold’s approach to administrative law shunned the design 
of a properly limited approach to judicial review and the study of the judiciary’s limited 
competence.  Instead, it was primarily a critical theory of the symbolic practices of governance, 
one that rejected a systematic, formal approach to administrative law.  At the same time, it was 
also an effort to reconstruct a flexible, multifaceted administrative law from available and new 
legal doctrines, in hopes of promoting a more efficient and effective state apparatus for 
overcoming the crisis of the Depression.  In the sections that follow, I provide a concise 
summary of Arnold’s post-realist approach before turning to his work on administrative law, 
where I consider his critical and reconstructive efforts in turn.  
99 Indeed, none of them appeared in Karl Llewelyn’s famous list of realists. See  Karl Llewellyn, Some 
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1227 n.10 (1931)  (“Frankfurter we 
do not include; he has been currently considered a ‘sociological jurist,’ not a ‘realist’”) but see HORWITZ, supra note 
5, at 213-25 (treating Landis and Frankfurter as realists).  The core of the Progressive/ New Deal administrative law 
scholarship emerged from Harvard beginning in the early twentieth century, in the scholarship of Bruce Wyman, 
Roscoe Pound, Thomas Reed Powell, Frankfurter, and the stream of Frankfurter’s students like Dickinson and 
Landis that filled the ranks of law schools across the country.  The core of the realist movement, by contrast, was 
located most prominently at Yale and Columbia.  At the same time, some of the Harvard-affiliated administrative 
law scholars, like Dean Pound and J. Forrester Davison, Frankfurter’s student and coauthor of his administrative law 
casebook, ranked among realism’s fiercest critics (and in Pound’s case, a fierce critic of the New Deal approach to 
administrative law that his work had foreshadowed decades earlier as well).  See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 156 (1995); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 618-21 (1993); cf. N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:  
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 212-15 (1997) (describing debate between Pound and Llewellyn 
over the extent to which those on the periphery of the realist movement, which included Frankfurter and Landis, 
were sufficiently “realistic” and distinct from the legal academic norm).  This is not to ignore the fact that many of 
the first generation administrative law scholars saw themselves as anti-formalist.  Writing in 1927, for example, 
John Dickinson noted the “slumbering” common law tradition that led government and law to be perceived as 
opposites and the latter to control the former “by the supposedly fixed and absolute standards of an Abstract Law.”
DICKINSON, supra note 42, at 77, 98-99.  As I showed in Part I-C, Landis also occasionally deployed a critical irony 
to his formalist predecessors that resembled realists’ rhetoric. But a limited anti-formalism should not be confused 
with a fully committed realism, which core realists espoused.
100 See DUXBURY, supra note 99, at 155 -57.  Administrative law at Harvard was sufficiently different from a 
realist vision of administrative law to provoke Adolf Berle, a New Dealer at Columbia, to describe a “conflict 
between the idea of administrative law developed at Harvard and the idea of self executed law as we try to think of it 
at Columbia.”  NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1928-1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 150 (Beatrice Bishop 
Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973).
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A. Arnold’s Post-Realism.
Arnold has been miscast as one of, and/or as an extreme version of, the legal realists that 
swept the legal academy during the 1930s.101  Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, Arnold both 
extended and broke from realism by considering the implications of realist insights into areas of 
public law that mainstream realism had previously neglected and by using new critical 
methodologies to develop a singular, idiosyncratic approach to law.102  While the traditional 
legal realist critique revealed the historically constructed and contingent nature of the legal forms 
that legal formalists essentialized,103 Arnold instead inquired into the deeper importance of the 
cultural “symbols” and “folklore” of governance, and especially into the disjunction between the 
ideological spirituality of form and what he called the “temporal” needs of society and the 
functional means to address them.104  Like the realists generally,105 Arnold’s work featured both 
a critical and a reformist mode.106  His critical impulse was generally more prevalent in his 
writings, and was and remains the basis for his reputation—although, as I note in Part II-C, his 
ideas for a flexible approach to judicial review of administrative agency action was especially 
innovative (if not especially detailed and never followed by courts or commentators).
In developing his critical approach, Arnold appropriated—often without clear 
101 See KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM, supra note 24, at 34 -35; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT 67-69 (1973); Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The Ideological Journey of Thurman 
Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1971); Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism About Realism? 
Thurman Arnold and the Politics of Modern Jurisprudence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 11, 12 (1990); John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 
511-12, 569-70 & n.589, 585 (1979).
102 See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1059-72.  Much of what follows in this Part is a summary of that article, and 
a more detailed development of and support for this summary is available therein.
103 The literature of and on realism, in its complexity and variable manifestations, is vast.  The realism with 
which Arnold is associated and which most interested him was at once critical of prevailing formalism and 
conceptualism, and committed to reconstructing a more functional, empirically-based approach to law.  See id. at 
1061-66.  The most trenchant recent accounts of realism are DUXBURY, supra note 99, at 65-159; KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM, supra note 24; JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 19 
(1995).
104 ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96, at 20.
105 See KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM, supra note 24, at 3; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1220-26 (1985).
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attribution—the insights of the emerging qualitative social sciences of the early twentieth 
century.  These included liberal psychologists and sociologists performing ideology and 
propaganda studies (most prominently Harold Lasswell,107 Vilfredo Pareto,108 and Walter 
Lippmann109), anthropologists and folklorists (such as Bronislaw Malinowski110 and Franz 
Boas111) studying the folkloric and symbolic practices of “primitive societies,” and institutional 
economists (such as Thorstein Veblen112 and Walton Hamilton, Arnold’s colleague at Yale113) 
who focused on the social context of economic and social behavior.114  Although his focus was 
rarely on developing specific political or economic proposals, Arnold inherited from 
institutionalist economics the vision of a structural, mechanistic solution to the endemic 
weaknesses and imbalances of capitalism through such devices as government intervention in 
setting prices and wages and disciplining corporations.115  Claiming to perform the role of a 
“diagnostician” who sought to understand and explain the context and pathologies of the political 
debates of the mid- to late-1930s, and, ultimately, to intervene on the side of the New Deal with 
106 See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1064-66.
107 See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 183-93 (1930); Lasswell, The Function of 
the Propagandist, 38 INT’L J. ETHICS 258 (1928); Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 627 (1927).
108 VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY at v, v-vi (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Livingston, trans., 
Arthur Livingston ed., 1935).
109 WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 365 (1922).  
110 See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
111 See Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, 20 SCIENCE 512, 519 (1904); Frank Boas, The Mind of 
Primitive Man, 14 J. AM. FOLKLORE 1, 2-3 (1901).
112 Veblen’s major works include: THORBEIN VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTERESTS AND THE COMMON MAN 90-93 
(Capricorn, 1969) (1919); VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS, 233 
(1919); VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
119 (Modern Library 1934) (1898); and Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science? 12 Q. J. EC. 373, 
388 (1898). 
113 Hamilton’s major works include: WALTON H. HAMILTON, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INSTITUTIONALISM: 
SELECTED ESSAYS (Joseph Dorfman ed., 1974); Hamilton, Institution, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 84 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1932); and HAMILTON & HELEN R. WRIGHT, A WAY OF ORDER FOR 
BITUMINOUS COAL (1928).  
114 See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1078-94.
115 See THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR LEGACIES, 
1931-1993, at 1-11, 65-67 (1997)
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the prevalent intellectual tools of his era,116 Arnold analyzed the conservative political, 
economic, and legal formalisms that prevented the emergence of a modern industrial America he 
thought would be able to overcome the Depression.117  A diagnosis of what he called “the taboos 
and customs of the tribe”—the symptoms of the dominant political culture that structure political 
discourse and extend into all of a society’s institutions—was a necessary prerequisite to 
developing a properly functional, practical solution to the Depression or to any other crisis or 
problem faced by modern society.118   Arnold therefore proposed a shift from realism’s focus on 
the mere critique of law’s surface forms and practices, or its temporal inefficiencies, to an 
inquiry into the deeper spiritual, symbolic forms and practices that shape law as a field of 
governance.
Arnold thus aligned himself with legal formalists and traditional economists (whose work 
realists also critiqued) by arguing that certain assumptions regarding legal doctrine, political 
structure, and a capitalist economy seemed essential to the governing institutions of the United 
States.  But he also agreed with legal realists that many of those assumptions were outdated, 
inefficient, and unjust.  Unlike conventional realists, Arnold had little faith that mere reform 
would cure governing institutions and the public of their irrational investments in the symbols of 
government and capitalism.  Such symbols, he argued, form the terrain upon which the struggle 
for political and legal changes takes place.  Realists sought to debunk symbols; Arnold sought to 
understand and use them to reshape the public’s beliefs in “a science about law rather than a 
science of law.”119
116 ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96, at 205.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Thurman W. Arnold, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 690 (1936).
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Arnold’s project, then, was to develop a critical method and voice that could best 
understand the “symbols of government” and the “folklore of capitalism” as the popular 
monographs named them.120  The result was a provocative, though underdeveloped, approach to 
the study of governance that he called “Political Dynamics,”121 as well as an ironic and critical 
voice that remains memorable for its ability to deflate the pretentious assumption that legal and 
political institutions should somehow uphold consistent, timeless, abstract principles.122  A 
reflexive proponent of an excessive functionalism, Arnold sought only those policies and 
institutions that he thought could best maximize the welfare of citizens.123  But he did so while 
also recognizing the role culture and signification play within institutions and in society and the 
popular need to believe in consistent, timeless, abstract symbols.  It was this dual approach—a 
post-realism that combined realism’s critical functionalism with a social scientific interest in 
studying the prevailing culture and ideology of his time—that Arnold brought to the study of 
administrative law.  I introduce that approach in the sections that follow.
B. Critiquing the “Symbols” of Administrative Governance.
The final three chapters of Arnold’s first book, The Symbols of Government (1935), apply 
the critique of formalism that Arnold had developed in the book’s previous chapters to the 
judicial, jurisprudential, and political resistance to the administrative agencies associated with 
the New Deal.124  In the grand hierarchy of governing institutions, Arnold lamented, the 
administrative tribunal and agency faced a long, largely uphill battle.  He contrasted the work of 
120 ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96; ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1. 
121 Arnold defined Political Dynamics as “a science about society that treats its ideals, its literature, its 
principles of religion, law, economics, political systems, creeds, and mythologies as part of a single whole and not as 
separate subjects, each with its own independent universe of principles.”  ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96, at 
349.
122 See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1095-1100 (connecting Arnold’s ironic voice to those of H.L. Mencken and 
Thorstein Veblen).
123 See, e.g., ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96, at 177 (adopting a normative principle “that it is a good thing 
to produce and distribute as much goods as the inventive and organizing genius of man makes possible”); see also
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the tribunal and agency to the work of courts in a criminal trial, a powerful, well-known 
spectacle that provides a certain degree of comfort and satisfaction for political subjects in its 
procedural format and seemingly impartial application of substantive law.  The administrative 
tribunal and agency could never compete with this popular conception of the judge and legal 
proceedings as upholder of the “Law.”  In their operations, administrative agencies simply failed 
to provide the necessary symbolic assurance that the underlying philosophical disputes about the 
relationship between the State and the individual had been fairly considered and resolved.125
More than any constitutional doctrine or political resistance, this symbolic deficit not only left 
agencies vulnerable to political and legal challenges, but rendered them inferior in power and 
prestige to the judiciary that would resolve any legal dispute concerning agencies.
Like Frankfurter and Landis, Arnold’s overriding legal focus in Symbols and his second 
book, The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), was on the judicial review of administrative agencies.  
Arnold was convinced that agencies enjoyed relative advantages in investigating and attacking 
the largest economic and social problems of the day.  He claimed, for example, that 
administrative agencies would enable the country to benefit from their “huge reservoir of 
technical skill, capable of running a great productive machine with energy and efficiency.”126  He 
rejected the traditional schema that juxtaposed administrative agencies—the looming, demonic 
symbols of bureaucracy—against the privileged judiciary—the supposedly neutral institution 
with sacred powers to interpret the Constitution and scrutinize legislative and administrative 
actions.127  The widespread judicial fetish of an apolitical, objective judiciary, combined with the 
ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 266-67 (arguing that functional, temporal governance was the most important 
goal of government and the basis of a “new humanitarian creed” he hoped would sweep the United States).
124 See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 172-271.
125 See id. at 133.
126 Id. at 266-67.
127 Id. at 205-06.  See also SHAMIR, supra note 6, at 99-100 (placing Arnold in the context of other elite 
lawyers and legal academics who championed administrative agencies over the judiciary as state actors most likely 
to respond effectively to the Depression).
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prevailing negative conception of administrative law by conservative members of the bar and 
bench, assumed an inherent value in maintaining a strict separation of the tri-partite branches of 
government.128  It was this assumption, Arnold believed, that enabled a formalist, conservative 
judiciary to thwart the New Deal’s efforts to promote the production and distribution of the 
“comforts” necessary to relieve the Depression.129
The problem, Arnold argued, was symbolic and procedural.  Formalism’s legal 
distinction between courts and agencies, which in his more conventional realist mode he happily 
debunked, was in fact constituted by the prevailing symbolic duality between courts and 
agencies.  The rule of law and its various institutions and practices, in other words, were the 
results of a powerful need for symbols of authority and stability.  Law’s symbolic authority 
presumes a powerful judiciary that is fair, impartial, and necessarily protective of individual 
freedoms, and that is therefore opposed to and above the dangerous “bureaucracy” of 
administrative agencies.  The judiciary resolves disputes that the bureaucracy creates, and in so 
doing demonstrates its inherent superiority in the hierarchy of government and in its abilities to 
govern.
Most importantly, courts profit from their position as institutions that merely apply legal 
authority, in the form of neutral rules of procedure and substantive common and statutory law 
that are external to them.  Courts rely upon externally-derived, pre-existing, and arcane rules of 
procedure and justiciability that protect them from the intrusion of heated political arguments 
128 Arnold was specifically reacting to the Court’s reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine in the mid-
1930s.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 
1935 for unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to fix hours and wages to certain coal producers and 
miners); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring National Industrial Recovery Act 
unconstitutional because its codes of fair competition lacked enforcement standards); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
239 U.S. 389 (1935) (declaring section 9(c) of National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional for granting 
President authority to determine and enforce policies regarding production and transportation of petroleum).  These 
cases marked what G. Edward White calls the “unexpected” and temporary shift by the Court back to a “traditional 
separation of powers theory” in the mid-1930s.  WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 108.
129 See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 252-53.
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and provide them sufficient discretion to avoid certain disputes at certain times.  Accordingly, 
even when the results of their decisions are difficult and troubling, courts are never at fault so 
long as they follow preconstituted fair procedures and preconstituted substantive law.130  Law’s 
“supremacy”—a presumption shared even among proponents of administrative agencies131—
inoculated the judiciary, as an abstract institution, from systemic criticism as well as from 
criticism directed at individual justices and judges who obstructed the development of 
administrative agencies.  Bureaucracies symbolized the inverse.  They establish their own 
substantive rules and procedures, “that silly form of rule and precedent known as red tape,” 
which they apply to their subjects, and therefore appear less objective and legal.  Unlike the 
judiciary, which appears to be a neutral, apolitical institution that is physically and politically 
removed from the disputes it settles, agencies, as part of the Executive Branch, seem directly 
connected to the political hurly-burly.132
The judiciary also thrived, Arnold argued, by limiting itself and its exercise of power, 
while agencies were required to engage in vast acts of regulatory intrusion in order to achieve 
their mandated goals.  Although courts gain prestige by appearing to settle disputes while 
making the law “more and more certain,” they only actually settle limited issues presented before 
them, and thereby “owe their power to the fact that they never clarify total situations.”133  By 
refusing to consider the next question that is likely to be brought to them or the implications of 
their own decisions, courts reserve their decisional capital and “obtain a power to keep litigants 
guessing.”134  Agencies, by contrast, are typically required by statutory mandate to develop 
comprehensive regulatory schemes and enforce civil law, and therefore cannot perform their 
130 See id. at 205-06.
131 See text accompanying supra notes 49-55, 88- 91.
132 See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 205-06.
133 Id. at 173.
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duties in so incremental and restrained a manner.135  They therefore appear unduly intrusive, 
unwieldy, and bureaucratic, especially when compared to the removed, refined domain of the 
judiciary.
The epitome of this symbolic universe was the “trial by combat” model of litigating 
challenges to administrative action.  In litigating, Article III courts adjudicate challenges to entire 
statutory and regulatory regimes through the prism of a dispute between one or more individuals 
and the agency and/or federal government.  Arnold saw this as a foolishly inefficient and 
indeterminate means for evaluating the legality and wisdom of an agency’s actions.136  Courts 
decide only individual cases and controversies brought to them by the parties to the suit, even 
when such cases represent a small part of a particular regulatory scheme.  Courts also require 
parties to follow arcane procedural rules; base their decisions solely upon a developed record 
produced by the parties themselves; and choose, where necessary, from a limited menu of 
remedies.137  In short, cases and the ensuing combat “must just happen” and may require the 
expenditure of millions of dollars and extensive delays—an approach that “does not permit a 
coherent or planned scheme for judicial participation in government regulation.”138
The appellate decision, the ultimate result of the trial by combat, is singularly unhelpful 
for regulatory programs.  The Supreme Court’s “delphic pronouncements” in the period leading 
up to its declaring the National Recovery Act unconstitutional, for example, often dodged the 
crucial constitutional issues the public debated, and even its decision in Schechter Poultry failed 
fully to resolve the fate of any of the other acts pending before Congress.139  Nevertheless, the 
Court merely added to its own luster by refusing to resolve the constitutional issues it was 
134 Id. at 174.
135 See ibid.
136 See generally id. at 172-98 (criticizing “trial by combat” model of judicial review).  
137 Id. at 184.
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charged with considering:
Here is a government of symbols in its most rarefied essence.  The Court had 
played its hand with great skill, and emerged triumphant as an institution.  The 
Constitution was more revered and feared than ever before.  But still no one 
quite knew just what had happened—what was constitutional, or 
unconstitutional.140
Courts thus separate themselves from the regulatory process by remaining “aloof from 
investigation and regulation” and awaiting a challenge to a specific “action or threatened action 
which has damaged, or is about to damage, some particular person.”141  And by asserting their 
authority to decide the constitutionality of regulatory rules developed by an agency’s 
investigation, courts could either dodge a controversy or “take pot shots at specific regulations 
without being forced to assume responsibility for the regulatory scheme as a whole.”142  Agency 
adjudications faced no better fate.  To review individual complaints against regulatory 
enforcement, agencies such as the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration developed their own internal administrative processes that 
incorporated legal folklore, only to face uncertain appellate review again.143
Even when agencies defeated a challenge to a regulation or an action, they lost the larger 
war.  In victory, agencies assumed the symbolic role of the bureaucratic victor over an individual 
subject to its regulatory power, in a battle whose outcome is determined by the judiciary’s 
higher, neutral authority.144  Judicial supremacy, and concomitant administrative inferiority, 
emanate from the formalist symbolic hierarchy that privileges the judiciary and law over 
agencies and policy.  The judiciary gives its blessing upon, and thereby confers temporary 
legitimacy to, the agency’s action; but future, more lasting legitimacy will require further 
138 Id. at 181.
139 Id. at 176-77 (citing Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495).
140 Id. at 178.
141 Id. at 182-83.
142 Id. at 189.
143 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 937 -38.
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blessings provided at the conclusion of additional, time consuming, and expensive trials by 
combat.
This symbolic structure of administrative law produced the peculiar pathologies of legal 
resistance to the New Deal.  Formalism’s enduring symbolic construction of courts and 
administrative agencies perpetuated the folkloric belief that courts protect individual freedom 
while administrative agencies are demonic forces of inefficiency and collectivity, and that courts 
represent a “rule of law above men” while administrative tribunals “apply practical 
considerations to court decisions.”145  The symbolic assumptions of the formalist approach to 
administrative law granted conservative courts—already predisposed to strike down new 
regulatory regimes and rules under the false assumption that they were thereby protecting 
freedom—too much discretion to reverse agency decisions and the legislative authorization of 
regulation.  Agencies were therefore relegated to secondary status behind the judiciary, 
especially when their specific actions or general legal authority faced a legal challenge.  As a 
form of dispute resolution and state power, litigation appeared to be an essential and natural 
element of nineteenth century laissez faire ideology that remained prevalent in the mid-twentieth 
century.   As such, litigation provided little more than
a series of miracle plays to give [the individual dispute and its judicial resolution] a 
theatrical development.  In the memory of the present generation the moral lesson of the 
judicial miracle play has been that rugged individuals are not regulated.  Instead, they 
fight for their rights.  In this battle they expect government to let them alone.146
The emerging field of administrative law practice and the first generation administrative 
law scholarship decidedly failed to recognize this symbolic base and conservative bias of 
144 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 187.
145 ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 96, at 372.
146 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 188.  Interestingly, Arnold’s use of the term “trial by combat” echoes 
Roscoe Pound’s characterization of “the sporting theory of justice” as one of the “causes of popular dissatisfaction 
with the administration of justice” that could be cured by a shift from courts to administrative tribunals.   Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906).
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governance and litigation—in fact, first generation scholars, despite their good intentions, merely 
proposed to mire agencies further in the folklore of judicial supremacy and procedure.  Arnold 
likened efforts to develop a new administrative process, whether by New Deal proponents or 
critics, to the “double-headed system of law and equity” that failed to assist dispute resolution 
and only led to confusion among courts, attorneys, and laypeople.147  Because the prevailing 
symbolic hierarchy required a clear separation of regulatory agencies and the judiciary, he 
speculated, such confusion was likely to persist as academics developed their “dialectic 
exploration and footnotes” that would explain the correctness of a new system.148   For Arnold, an 
administrative state built around judicial supremacy would not, in the long run, achieve the larger 
goal of establishing independent, effective administrative agencies.  And so he set out for himself 
the task of proposing an alternative means to provide a legal basis and structure for agency 
operations.
C. Arnold’s Administrative Law.
Like Landis and Frankfurter, Arnold saw the work of the administrative lawyer and law 
professors as focused on the scope and practice of judicial review.  He assumed the necessity and 
legitimacy of administrative agencies within the modern state, and wasted little of his time 
considering the actual practices and decisions of a particular agency.  Accordingly, when Arnold 
proposed a notion of administrative law that was distinct from those of either skeptics or 
proponents of the administrative state, he did so by rethinking the parameters of judicial review 
and the relationship among the three branches of government.  In that regard, he was not akin to 
Frank Goodnow or Ernst Freund, whose work focused either on internal agency operations or 
means to police or expand agency discretion.  Moreover, his view departed from that of his 
predecessors or contemporaries largely with respect to judicial review of agency rulemaking; 
147 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 940.
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when “lowly and oppressed” individuals sought redress for particularized grievances through an 
adjudicatory challenge of a regulation as it applied to them, Arnold conceded that the judiciary 
must uphold the fundamental ideal of the fair trial.  As he characteristically explained:  “In the 
celebration of legal and economic theories [when reviewing rulemaking], the Court should be 
equipped only with prayer books and collections of familiar quotations.  In the protection of 
those seeking a fair trial it should be armed with a sword which it dared to use with courage.”149
Regarding the narrow but important legal issues surrounding the judicial review of 
administrative rulemaking, however, Arnold offered a radically distinct program than his 
contemporaries.
Arnold’s proposed method of judicial review of regulatory administrative actions did not 
specifically require courts to uphold all such actions, whether proposed by Roosevelt’s New Deal 
or by some other administration or political movement.150  He did, however, assert that a judge 
who recognizes “the evanescent nature of any form of social bookkeeping will hesitate to 
interfere with any exercise of governmental power which is sincere in its purpose and honestly 
designed as an experiment in social welfare.”151  In a clear echo of Holmes, Arnold warned 
against a court’s “stand[ing] guard over any legal or economic theory,” lest that theory lose favor 
148 Id. at 942.
149 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 197.  One might wonder how a realist like Arnold could be so secure 
in the adjudication/ rulemaking distinction.  The distinction had been established in the early part of the twentieth 
century in the procedural due process context and had been formulated in part by no less an anti-formalist than 
Justice Holmes.  See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (Holmes, J.) 
(taxpayer has no right to expect individualized hearing before legislative revaluing of property); Londoner v. 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (individual property owners had a right to an individual hearing to challenge 
individualized special tax assessment on their property).  It remains in force today, despite protestation by no less a 
formalist than Justice Thomas, who has challenged its logic in the context of Takings Clause jurisprudence.  See
Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls 
Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1256-57 (1992) (discussing current 
salience of adjudicative/ legislative distinction).
150 See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 196 (“There is no formula for exercise of such power.”).
151 Id.  
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among scholars and legitimacy among the public.152 Ultimately, Arnold favored judicial 
solutions that would enable agencies the opportunity to experiment, that would require courts to 
review an agency’s actions almost entirely in light of the interests of society as a whole rather 
than in terms of the plaintiff’s interests, that would provide “speedy methods” of appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and that would involve the participation of the judiciary in federal 
regulatory regimes.153
In an effort to enable “an orderly, planned participation of courts in the growing area of 
governmental regulation,” Arnold proposed a number of solutions to the problems caused by the 
prevailing conception of strictly separate powers policed by a powerful judiciary.154  I discuss 
these below.  Common among each of the methods he suggests was the assumption that 
necessary experimentation in the relationship between agencies and courts, and in the work of 
agencies, had been unduly checked by the relative hierarchy that granted the judiciary 
significantly higher status and power over administrative agencies.  Courts could approve or 
strike down entire regimes months or even years after the agency had approved them, and 
agencies worked in fear that any new rules they proposed would be similarly challenged and 
struck down at some indeterminate later date by some as-yet unidentified court under some as-
yet unknown legal theory.155  Also common to each of these methods was the assertion that the 
lines between branches of government should not simply be redrawn or reconceived as 
permeable boundaries.  Rather, they should be obliterated, with the judiciary lending its prestige 
to agencies by engaging in active but limited oversight in the regulatory process while using its 
power and expertise to protect individuals challenging unfair and oppressive agency decisions.  
As Arnold explained in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, he thought that “a judiciary which was 
152 Id.; compare Lochner v. New York, 190 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But a Constitution is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory.”).
153 See Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 944 -45.  
154 Id. at 937.
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permitted to face real problems” would employ “looser and more practical” approaches to the 
problem of federal regulation, and would invoke a rhetorical “dialectic” that was “more poetical 
and symbolic” in upholding and assuming the responsibility for “planned administration.”156
Arnold’s proposals ultimately sought to appropriate and display the symbols of governance while 
subverting the first generation’s tendencies towards creating logical systems of judicial review.
These proposals remained undeveloped in Arnold’s work, and lack even the appearance 
of a system or program.  Rather, they are an exercise in anti-formalist guerilla intervention into a 
field fast solidifying around a coherent, systematic structure of agency expertise and judicial 
review.  Despite their larger incoherence, they do sort into three types:  those that sought greater 
judicial involvement in rulemaking, those that enabled quicker judicial consideration of 
challenges to regulatory programs that courts would consider in a relatively non-adversarial 
context, and those that proposed greater agency independence from judicial review. 
1.  Faster Judicial Decisions
Arnold was among those during the mid-1930s who called for federal courts to have the 
authority to issue declaratory judgments in constitutional challenges to government action—a 
group large enough to be characterized by a law student author in the Harvard Law Review in 
1938 as making “[t]he familiar cry for a more speedy adjudication of constitutional issues free 
from ‘technical’ barriers.”157  He embraced declaratory judgments, as well as (even more 
controversially) advisory opinions, for allowing courts to reach a decision without the formality 
of a trial or the risk of remedies that might otherwise attach to constitutionally impermissible 
actions.158  Both would give legislators, regulators, and regulated parties the opportunity to know 
155 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 192-93.  
156 VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 7, at 201-02 (reprinting letter from Thurman Arnold to Felix 
Frankfurter, June 11, 1934).
157 Note, Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1938).
158 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 185.
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whether a statute or set of regulations are constitutionally permissible, and whether private 
actors’ contemplated courses of conduct would run afoul of statutory and regulatory limits.159
Leaving aside the advisory opinion, which Arnold correctly predicted would not be 
adopted at the federal level,160 Arnold wrote in the period that the declaratory judgment emerged 
as a legitimate judicial remedy for federal causes of action.  A decade earlier, even the 
Progressive voice of Justice Brandeis had not only pronounced in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium 
Association that the declaratory judgment was beyond the power granted statutorily to the federal 
judiciary, but noted that the remedy exceeded the justiciability limits of Article III’s “cases and 
controversies” limitation.161  Frankfurter agreed:  declaratory judgments were unwise and beyond 
the constitutional pale.162  Nevertheless, state legislatures had begun to adopt the declaratory 
judgment in the early twentieth century,163 and five years after Brandeis’s decision in Willing the 
Court held that a suit originally brought in state court under the state’s declaratory judgment act 
could present a justiciable appeal to the Supreme Court, “so long as the case retains the essentials 
of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical controversy, which is finally 
determined by the judgment below.”164  At least in part as a result of the Court’s changed 
159 Id. at 186.
160 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65 (6th ed. 2002) (describing 
the rejection of the advisory opinion within the federal system as “the oldest and most consistent thread in the 
federal law of justiciability”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 78-79 (5th ed. 2003) (reproducing correspondence between President George 
Washington’s cabinet and the Supreme Court, which the Court refused to respond to a series of twenty-nine 
questions seeking “extrajudicial[]” answers).
161 See Willing et al. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).  One rising star of the legal academy 
and student of Felix Frankfurter, Louis Jaffe, applauded Justice Brandeis’s skepticism about the declaratory 
judgment to review legislation and administrative action.  See Jaffe, Contributions, supra note 60, at 217-18.
162 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, 
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, at ch. 5 (2000)[hereinafter BRANDEIS]; Felix Frankfurter  & Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1932, 47 HARV. L. REV. 245, 286 n.96 (1933).
163 See Edwin M. Borchard, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 18 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1934); 
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law, 11 N.Y.U. L. Q. 139 (1933).  
164 See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).  Justice Stone, who authored the 
decision, had filed a separate concurrence in Willing refusing to conclude that declaratory judgments are beyond the 
constitutional scope of Article III courts.
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perspective, Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,165 which the Court 
unanimously upheld against a constitutional challenge in 1937.166  Soon thereafter, declaratory 
judgments became a central remedy within administrative law.  The original Administrative 
Procedure Act, passed in 1946, expressly permitted any person “adversely affected or aggrieved” 
by Agency action to seek “Judicial Review” thereof by “actions for declaratory judgments,”167
while courts, commentators, and the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 
praised the declaratory judgment as a remedy capable of solving disputes over administrative 
action.168
But Arnold wanted more from the remedy, and in the mid-1930s criticized its impending 
domestication.  He was convinced that declaratory judgments, like advisory opinions, were 
unlikely to emerge as a new way of testing and reviewing regulations because they would throw 
the Court into a political maelstrom that it sought to avoid in order to protect its “aloof and 
strategic position, and thereby its priestly power.”169 The narrow vision of declaratory judgments 
in state legislatures (and, by implication, in the Supreme Court’s requirements of appeals from 
state courts) blunted the remedy’s radical potential by merely reproducing the old case and 
controversy requirement in a new form.  “The very fact that it has surrounded itself with such an 
enormous body of learned literature, philosophy, and cases during the brief period of its 
acceptance,” Arnold complained ironically, “indicates that the framers of [declaratory judgment 
165 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1934).
166 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
167 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009 (1946).
168 See Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess.; Quinones v. Landron, 99 F.2d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1938) (citing as “one of the benefits” of 
declaratory judgments “the opportunity afforded to resolve disputes arising over the powers, duties and privileges of 
administrative officers”); Note, Declaratory Judgments—1941 to 1949, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949) (“In the field 
of public the Declaratory Judgment offers both Government and the individual a means for the determination of 
disputed powers and duties, which avoids the risk of taking action which later may prove to be illegal.”).
169 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 186; see also Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 930 (noting 
that declaratory judgments are “quite rare, probably due to the unfamiliar language of the formidable literature 
which has clustered about this . . . logical device”).
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acts] have been anxious not to depart from the traditions of the past.”170  And indeed, the federal 
act limited declaratory judgments to “cases of actual controversy,”171 a limitation that the Court 
cited as essential to the Act’s constitutionality by establishing a remedy and procedure resulting 
from “an adjudication of present right upon established facts” rather than “an advisory opinion 
upon a hypothetical basis.”172  Decrying the excessively technical requirements of the federal 
declaratory judgment as it was understood and promoted by his Yale colleague Edwin Borchard, 
Arnold ultimately envisioned the remedy as a post hoc advisory opinion in which constitutional 
challenges to statutes and regulations could be adjudicated quickly, and courts could not avoid 
“inconvenient cases” through excessive “‘judicial’ thinking” that forced the presentation of cases 
in particular ways at a particular stage of development.173
He also advocated, but was equally ambivalent about, the use of injunctions as a remedy 
for challenges to New Deal legislation.174  Injunctions promised speedy resolution of issues at a 
preliminary stage as well as the possibility of ongoing jurisdiction and judicial oversight in 
administering the remedy.  On the one hand, a request for injunctive relief allowed courts a 
certain degree of discretion in awarding and crafting a remedy while they still worked within the 
conventional framework of the trial by combat.  But the use of injunction was significantly less 
than perfect precisely because the legal standard for its issuance was too indeterminate.  Within 
the trial by combat framework, courts could use the undefined irreparable harm standard to delay 
or strike down regulatory programs permanently, while a temporary injunction’s cost and 
uncertainty might result in a de facto permanent end to an agency’s efforts.175  Moreover, the 
requirement that a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of a statute or regulation first violate it 
170 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 926.
171 Federal Declaratory Judgment Act § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1934). 
172 Haworth, 300 U.S. at 242.
173 VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 7, at 202-03 (reprinting letter from Thurman Arnold to Felix 
Frankfurter, June 11, 1934). 
174 See Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 929 -30.
46
created an undue hazard for potential plaintiffs who feared having to face penalties if they failed 
to win.176  The litigation by case or controversy model, even when applied in the early and 
relatively speedy context of a preliminary injunction hearing, required unnecessary acts and 
considerations in order to obtain a resolution of the constitutional issue with which the interested 
parties were concerned.
2.  Greater Judicial Involvement
Accordingly, Arnold considered options that abandoned the traditional litigation model.  
His proposals included not only excluding judicial review entirely, which I discuss in the next 
section, but, paradoxically, efforts to increase judicial involvement by including courts in the 
rulemaking process itself.  The notion that courts and agencies should operate together as agency 
partners, rather than as separate, often adversarial, elements within a system of government, was 
not entirely new.177  Nor was the notion of partnership or collaboration foreign to administrative 
law scholars and advocates of the administrative state, including Justice Frankfurter himself.178
But Arnold’s efforts, predictably, were intended to push courts more emphatically and 
structurally into partnership with agencies.  The most radical of these efforts would have courts 
175 Id.
176 Id. at 930.
177 Congress has a long history of creating specialized courts to ease the caseload burden faced by federal 
courts of jurisdiction, develop judges with specific expertise in complex areas and long-term oversight of agency 
operations, and increase the efficiency of adjudicating disputes.  See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in 
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (1991).  For an overview of specialized courts today, see 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 41-46 (5th
ed. 2003).  Through still formally separate, such courts promised to solve some of the problems Arnold and others 
identified with traditional federal judicial review.  In Arnold’s time, the most recent effort to create a specialized 
court to review decisions by one agency was the Commerce Court that President Taft proposed in 1910 to review 
Interstate Commerce Court decisions.  See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 55, at 153 -74.  Taft envisioned the 
court as a means to bring together disparate economic and political interests, support the development of the 
administrative agency and its professional expertise, and to overcome the institutional obstacles to administrative 
regulation generally.  See SKYWROTE, supra note 9, at 262-63.  For largely political reasons resulting from the 
perception that it favored railroad interests, the court failed miserably and lasted only three years.  See George E. 
Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).
178 See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (describing agencies and courts as “collaborative 
instrumentalities of justice”); see generally Warren W. Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the 
Partnership Books, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 800-03 (1975) (tracing judicial and commentators’ use of “partnership” 
metaphor).
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treat agencies’ regulatory schemes “as they d[o] [the courts’] own masters, referees, or receivers 
. . . [u]nder a scheme of discretionary review.”179  Courts could thereby “approve or disapprove 
administrative regulations as they were formulated” and would therefore be responsible for 
“definite rules.”180  As a result, the judiciary engaged in administrative law would serve as “an 
investigating body” rather than “an arbiter of combats.”181  Such supervisory review would 
prevent the judiciary from invalidating agencies’ necessary experimentation with new rules and 
administration.  Courts would presumably be privy to the information and insights of experts 
without the cumbersome procedures of civil litigation, and would experience as well the 
difficulties and frustrations of formulating a regulatory response to a complex set of economic 
and social issues.  The administrative and judicial processes would thereby collapse or at least 
proceed simultaneously.  Agencies would operate as junior partners to courts in a partnership 
whose purpose was to develop regulatory programs.  As a result, agencies would no longer 
perceive courts as adversarial authorities whose review begins only after the agency has fully 
developed its programs.182
Although it would soon be codified in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
judicial use of a special master was a longstanding tradition in courts of equity,183 and the new 
rule largely adopted existing doctrine and practice.184  The court-appointed master and receiver 
models offered for Arnold an apparatus by which courts could, at their discretion, appoint and 
adopt an objective adjunct to supervise, investigate, and come up with proposed resolutions to a 
179 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 191.
180 Id. at 191-92.  Arnold conceded, however, that non-deferential judicial review of specific administrative 
actions should apply in instances in which an agency or commission makes quasi-judicial decisions.  In those 
instances, agency actions are more likely to appear arbitrary and personal, and a court’s review of the agency’s 
action is more likely to be based upon and limited by the kinds of issues (such as due process) over which courts
have expertise.  See id. at 202-03.
181 Id. at 192.  
182 Id. at 191-92.
183 James R. Bryant, The Office of Mastery in Chancery: Colonial Development, 40 A.B.A. J. 595 (1954).
184 Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA L. REV. 261, 291 (1939).
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particular matter.185  For similar reasons, Arnold identified the corporate reorganization, where 
federal courts relied upon receivers, committees, and masters to oversee, as another potential 
model for agency-court partnership.186  In the optimal equity receivership process that emerged 
by common law innovation, federal district courts oversaw a process by which the debtor and all 
its creditors and bondholders would negotiate a plan to enable the bankrupt corporation to get 
back on its feet financially.187  At the time Arnold was drawing this analogy, in the mid-1930s, 
his friend and Yale colleague William Douglas was helping to lead efforts to reform federal 
bankruptcy law in part by rationalizing receivership procedures through new federal statutes and, 
ultimately, by increasing federal oversight of the bankruptcy process through Securities and 
Exchange Commission investigations of large corporate reorganizations.188  For Arnold, the 
reorganization process’s openness, collaboration, and relatively active judicial involvement 
seemed to offer flexibility that was lacking in classic adversarial litigation.189
Arnold also wanted to develop a means by which courts could retain ongoing jurisdiction 
over regulatory programs.  He applauded the Supreme Court’s decision in Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, for example, where the Court affirmed a lower court’s “holding a suit open 
for purpose of experimental development” to see if an otherwise per se illegal combination of 
coal producers could nevertheless act in a reasonable manner to save the coal industry in 
Appalachia.190  Although it reversed the lower court’s ruling finding that a combination of coal 
185 For a thorough description of the duties to which courts assigned masters during the first half of the 
twentieth century, covering the period both before and after codification, see Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the 
Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 462-69 (1958).  On the continuing tension in American trial 
practice over the use of special masters to enable courts to gather understand scientific evidence, see Margaret G. 
Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927 (1994). 
186 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 930 -31.
187 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56-60 (2001).
188 See id. at 101-09; Note, Cloyd Laporte, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure Proposed by the 
Chandler and Lea Bills, 51 HARV. L. REV. 672, 675-77 (1938).
189 See Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 930 -31.  Arnold did criticize limitations placed on the 
court’s record that prevented a judge from supervising a bankrupt corporation’s transactions after approval of the 
reorganization plan.  See ibid.
190 Id. at 928 (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377-78 (1933).  
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operators had violated federal antitrust laws, the Court remanded the case with instruction that 
the lower court may retain jurisdiction for the purpose of taking remedial measures in the event 
that the defendants’ future operations prove to be illegal and against the public interest.191
Ongoing jurisdiction and oversight would again transform courts into partners with agencies in 
the latter’s regulatory programs.
3.  Minimize Judicial Involvement
Arnold also sought means to enable agencies to bypass, or at least minimize, judicial 
oversight.  To that end, he favored the consent decree, which he would later utilize extensively as 
head of the antitrust division of the Justice Department from 1938 to 1943.192  Since the mid-
1920s, the Justice Department had increasingly resolved civil suits enforcing antitrust laws 
against anti-competitive business activities through consent decrees in which defendants agreed 
to prospective injunctions against future illegal activity.193  An equitable means to end 
enforcement actions through tailored injunctions negotiated by the government and defendants, 
the government’s authority to enter into and hold parties to the terms of consent decrees had been 
upheld by the Supreme Court in two decisions in the years immediately preceding Arnold’s work 
on administrative law.194  In Swift II, its second consent decree decision, the Court also limited 
the ability of courts to modify existing decrees to “[n]othing less than a clear showing of 
191 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 378, overruled in part on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
192 See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM 111-12 (1995); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE 
PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 429-30 (1966); Milton Katz, Consent Decrees and Antitrust Administration, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 415 (1940).
193 See William H. Donovan & Breck P. McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-
Trust Laws 46 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885-86 (1933).  The attorney general used consent decrees significantly more 
often in the antitrust context because of provisions in the Sherman and Clayton Acts granting federal courts the 
authority to provide prospective injunctive relief against future criminal anti-competitive activity.  See Katz, supra
note 192, at 416-19.
194 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.  311 (1928) (“Swift I”); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 US 
106 (1932) (“Swift II”).
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grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.”195  To Arnold, the consent decree 
offered federal agencies welcome discretion in regulatory and legal enforcement with limited 
judicial oversight in its crafting and without cumbersome, fixed rules of judicial review.196  In the 
words of commentators writing contemporaneously with Arnold, the consent decree represented 
“law enforcement by negotiation,” enabling the parties to use this negotiation to “settle[] 
economic questions of great public importance” without the direct intervention of potentially 
conservative courts and the trial by combat mode of judicial dispute resolution.197
In a proposal that would have avoided judicial review altogether, Arnold suggested that 
agencies use arbitration with regulated parties to “escape . . . the judicial hunt for issues” by 
settling disputes over the constitutionality of legislation and agency action.198  Of course, 
advocating arbitration to settle disputes over matters of law—and especially of constitutional 
law—merely begs the question of whether and to what extent a party to arbitration could seek 
judicial review of the resulting decision or agreement.  Arnold did not propose an answer, but did 
respond to the controversy of judicial review of arbitrated settlements in his typical fashion by 
noting with bemused irony the unquestioned presumption that a nonjudicial resolution was 
inherently less fair and authoritative than a judicial one.199  For Arnold, the increasingly 
widespread use of arbitration as an “escape from law” made plain the unsettling fact that the 
“judicial system has been unable to include the settlement of many important types of 
disputes.”200  Dispute resolution, in other words, was more important to Arnold than the 
resolution of broad legal issues.  But arbitration was imperfect, Arnold conceded, not least 
195 Swift II, 286 U.S. at 119, overruled by Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992) 
(holding that the current Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) set down a “less stringent . . . standard” intended to meet the “need 
for flexibility in administering consent decrees”).
196 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 928.  Interestingly, Arnold did not propose either the consent 
decree or an Appalachian Coal-type judicial oversight in Symbols when he adapted (and shortened) the earlier “Trial 
by Combat” article.
197 Donovan & McAllister, supra note 193, at 912.
198 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 187.
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because arbitration agreements to settle disputes had “become technical and full of pitfalls,” and 
thereby defeated the purpose of avoiding the symbolic jurisprudential constraints that led him to 
seek refuge in arbitration as an alternative model.201  At the same time, at least arbitration offered 
a model for moving parties towards a reasonably agreeable resolution outside the folkloric realm 
of the trial by combat, with its initial uncertainty, its absolute winners and losers, and its 
presumption of judicial superiority.  
D. Conclusion.
Reform was inevitable, Arnold speculated, although not immediate; he believed that an 
imminent groundswell of popular belief in planning and a concomitant abandonment of laissez 
faire as an economic ideal would surely drive courts to “intelligent procedural planning.”202  Such 
reform was not likely to sweep away the old symbols.203  But the “practical elasticity” and 
relative indeterminacy of those symbols would allow for the emergence of a new, more efficient 
relationship between courts and agencies, while the traditional symbols of judicial review would 
survive to meet the “pontifical needs” and “deeply felt emotional want” of lawyers and the 
general public.204  The emergent New Deal and the residual formalist folklore, in other words, 
would by necessity coexist.
Although he recognized the importance of an independent judiciary as a symbol of 
governance, Arnold happily and creatively considered any functional solution that would more 
efficiently enable agencies to work what he believed to be their instrumental magic.  He 
eschewed both a case-driven focus on the federal appellate adjudication of constitutional issues 
199 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 928 -29.
200 Id. at 929.
201 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 187.
202 Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 945.
203 Id. at 947.  Nevertheless, at the end of both his 1934 article and Symbols, Arnold did hold out the 
possibility that the attachment to “trial by combat” was disappearing, despite his earlier commitment to the notion 
that such symbols had deep roots in popular and professional thought.  See id. at 947.
204 Id. at 946; ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 268-71.
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by common law development and the creation of a new-fangled approach to administrative law 
based on a comprehensive federal statute and a federal administrative court.  Instead, consistent 
with his general approach to legal thinking and pedagogy, he embraced an oddly inventive 
method of creating new means to avoid the trial by combat in pragmatic ways. In the preface to 
his casebook on trials, judgments, and appeals, co-authored with his Yale colleague Fleming 
James, Arnold declared:
[F]rom the point of view of this book, legal principles are regarded as an argumentative 
technique—in other words, as an arsenal of offensive and defensive weapons to be used 
in litigation. . . .  Inventiveness and ingenuity in the use of legal analogies are actually far 
more important in legal battles than scholarly learning.205
And so it was with his vision of the “principles” of administrative law.  Arnold’s conception of 
administrative law and government regulation, as well as his tenure as head of the Antitrust 
Division, demonstrates a strong push for structural change that, through the strategic deployment 
of using existing symbols and laws, would not appear as radical as it was.206  In his willingness to 
see through and abandon entirely the contingent, constructed symbols of judicial supremacy, as 
well as the constitutional monolith requiring the separation of government’s tri-partite branches, 
and in his eagerness to attack them offensively and defensively with both shopworn and newly 
formed weapons, Arnold stood alone.
III.
The “Mumbo-Jumbo of Legal Jargon”:  Frankfurter, Arnold,
and the Procedural Core of Administrative Law
Arnold’s lonely, outlying stance and kit bag approach to administrative law opposed the 
emerging consensus building around notions of relative institutional competencies and of judicial 
review as a limited, but important, safeguard for the modern liberal democracy.  As a prominent 
legal academic, he and his proposals did not go unnoticed.  In correspondence with Arnold and 
205 THURMAN W. ARNOLD & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND 
APPEALS at v-vi (1936).
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in the public forum of his casebook on federal jurisdiction, Felix Frankfurter summarily rejected 
Arnold’s vision of a more active judiciary engaged alongside administrative agencies in the 
regulatory state.  In so doing, Frankfurter and his co-authors clarified a vision of a judicial 
process that should be separate from, that should follow on, and that ultimately should structure 
and trump the administrative process in which he and Landis had so much faith.  This Part uses 
Frankfurter’s comments and work to identify the differences between the vision of administrative 
law developed by first generation scholars and Arnold’s criticism and alternative approach.  The 
contrast foregrounds the procedural core of administrative law by revealing what Frankfurter and 
Arnold saw as the stakes of the first generation’s project.  For Arnold, the logical system of 
administrative law stood in the way of the administrative state; for Frankfurter, administrative 
law provided the procedural protection that would enable both an administrative state and a 
stable, powerful judiciary.
Arnold was friends with both Frankfurter and Landis from at least his early days at 
Yale.207  The elder Frankfurter read his work and on occasion sent him comments.  After reading 
“Trial by Combat and the New Deal,” in which Arnold developed his approach to administrative 
law, Frankfurter praised its “frolicsome learning” and “liveliness of spirits.”208  But he ultimately 
rejected Arnold’s approach and satirized his refusal to distinguish “‘right’ or ‘wrong,’” and took 
sardonic umbrage at what he saw as Arnold’s call for a “new deal by the judiciary, with its 
slogan ‘government of the people, for the people and by the courts.’”209  He derided Arnold’s 
proposed “juristic offensive” as a secret plot to “arouse popular revulsion and thus lead to the 
206 See ROSENOF, supra note 115, at 10.
207 See VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 7, at 186 (reprinting letter from Thurman W. Arnold to Carl 
Arnold, May 20, 1932).
208 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Thurman Arnold (undated), Thurman Wesley Arnold papers, American 
Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, at Box 9.
209 Ibid.
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appropriate confinement of judicial power.”210  Whether Arnold secretly hoped courts would 
actively oversee administrative regulation so that their failure would destroy judicial authority 
and status—which is the implication of Frankfurter’s criticism—is unclear.  Perhaps, as 
Frankfurter suggested, Arnold was covertly trying to achieve what he had argued two years 
earlier in a major article in the Harvard Law Review: that procedure can serve as “an escape 
from substantive law” when the relevant legal rules seem opposed to reaching a desired result.211
At minimum, Frankfurter clearly considered Arnold’s ideas a bizarre effort to extend 
administrative law beyond constitutional limits.
In a 1928 monograph that he wrote with Landis, Frankfurter had begun to articulate a 
Progressive theory of the judiciary, imagining it as an institution with coherent and well-defined 
authority operating in a modern nation-state in which jurisdiction and procedure were themselves 
instruments of ends, or “means of effectuating policy.”212  And later, in an article written with 
Henry Hart, he advocated judicial resistance to the “undue suction into the avoidable polemic of 
politics” that arose from considering any and all constitutional challenges to the administrative 
process. 213  In that article, published the same year as Arnold’s “Trial by Combat,” Frankfurter 
and Hart thoroughly embraced the “seemingly technical rules” of jurisdiction as both a form of 
“wise statecraft” and as a set of “procedural safeguards” intended to protect the judiciary from 
210 Ibid.  They maintained this cordial rivalry throughout the 1930s.  A few years later, after Arnold’s success 
with Symbols and Folklore, Frankfurter sent Arnold a clipping from an editorial in the Montgomery (Alabama) 
Advertiser linking recent work by the two New Deal academics.  His cover note asked, “Isn’t it funny for them to 
link me with you?  Haven’t they heard of Newton and Einstein and Karl Marx and J.C.?”  It is unclear which role 
Frankfurter saw himself playing in those pairings.  Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Thurman Arnold, (Jan. 24, 1938) 
Thurman Wesley Arnold papers, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, at Box 11.
211 Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 
642-47 (1932) [hereinafter Role]; see generally Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on 
Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L. REV. 231, 244-46 (1990) (contextualizing Arnold’s argument within his advocacy in 
favor of the administrative state). 
212 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 55, at 2; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurteran 
Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQ. 679, 683- 84 (1999).
213 Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 
HARV L. REV. 68, 90 (1935).
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“subtle or daring attempts at procedural blockade-running.”214  Federal courts generally, and the 
Supreme Court specifically, must be strict regarding jurisdiction in constitutional cases to utilize 
the “accumulated experience” that has formed “the tradition of constitutional adjudication.”215
Proceeding in what Frankfurter and Hart declared was the traditional manner allowed the justices 
to appear as “statesmen,” and, most importantly, enabled “continuance of the Court’s traditional 
share in the government of our democratic society.”216  If it proceeded otherwise, the Court would 
affirmatively create or assert itself in inter-branch disputes in a way that could threaten its hard-
won prestige.217  In his 1938 review of the Court’s decision to find jurisdiction to review 
Congressional actions in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority218 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act,219 Frankfurter found instances in 
which—whether one agreed with the Court’s ultimate decision to uphold or strike down these 
two representative legislative schemes of the New Deal—the Court’s very grant of jurisdiction 
demonstrated that it had foolishly fallen prey to the “imponderable pressure of the public 
importance of the statutes under review.”220  If the doctrine of constitutional review that 
cautioned against bowing to such pressure were further unsettled, Frankfurter cautioned, 
“unnecessary friction [would be added] to the complicated workings of our government; it 
weakens the responsibility of Congress in shaping policy; it undermines vital confidence in the 
disinterested continuity of the judicial process.”221
214 Id. at 91.
215 Id. at 93-94.
216 Ibid.
217 Id. at 94, 98.
218 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth. (TVA), 297 U.S. 286 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the TVA’s authority to compete with private power companies in the sale and distribution of electric power to 
consumers).
219 See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 238 (1936) (striking down as unconstitutional the wage and hour commissions 
of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act).
220 Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 
1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 627-28 (1938).
221 Id. at 637.
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In his casebook on federal jurisdiction (written with Harry Shulman), Frankfurter pitted 
his and Hart’s argument about the necessity of federal jurisdiction’s role as a bulwark against the 
judiciary’s involvement in substantive matters against Arnold’s efforts to use procedure to force 
courts to reach substantive efforts.222  Consecutive excerpts within the opening chapter on the 
constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction and procedure reveal the crux of these opposing 
views.  For Frankfurter and Hart, jurisdictional limitations, and most notably the case or 
controversy requirement, reflect the “accumulated experience of a century and a half” of 
constitutional adjudication.223  Arnold saw no need for a case or controversy requirement at all, 
and considered it mere priestly ideology that limited dispute resolution to small, narrow issues 
argued by exaggeration and partisanship. 224   A rigid case or controversy requirement was hardly 
a forward-thinking doctrine to encourage development of administrative operations necessary to 
the modern state.  “The common law,” he argued, “is neither clear, sound, nor even capable of 
being restated in areas where the results of cases are being most bitterly contested.  And 
particularly with reference to administrative regulation does mutual exaggeration of opposing 
claims negative the whole theory of rational, scientific investigation.”225  To Frankfurter and 
Hart, this was foolish and silly:  
It is neither intellectual timidity nor adherence to the mumbo-jumbo of legal 
jargon that has made the Supreme Court from the very outset, on appeals to it, 
give very restricted scope to the concept of “case” or “controversy.”  The instinct 
of statesmen who were either participants in or witnesses to the fashioning of the 
Constitution decisively rejected any practice which would make of the Court a 
standing body of expert expounders of the Constitution.  If the Court was to have 
the vital function which it evolved for itself, the occasions for its authoritative 
intervention had to be severely circumscribed.226
222 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SHULMAN, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 92-94 (rev. ed. 1937) (excerpting Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 213, at 90-98); 94-
95 (excerpting Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 919-22).
223 Id. at 92 (quoting Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 213, at 90).
224 See id. at 94-95 (excerpting Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 11, at 919-22).
225 Id. at 95.
226 Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 213, at 94.
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When courts utilize the restraint and discretion offered by jurisdictional limitations, Frankfurter 
and Hart claimed, they engage in a reasoned effort to preserve the institutional competence of the 
judiciary.
Theirs was the most sophisticated vision of judicial restraint of any first generation 
administrative law scholars.  They assumed that proper, constitutionally-limited legal process at 
once sufficiently constrained the administrative process and allowed that process to develop 
expert policy.  For Arnold, a judiciary restrained by a limited vision of its constitutional duty and 
authority unduly delayed the implementation of necessary federal regulation, provided courts 
with political cover from difficult decisions, and delegitimated agencies relative to courts by 
simultaneously claiming authority to pass constitutional judgment over agency action and 
refusing to do so in a particular instance (while reserving the privilege to do so later).  For first 
generation administrative law scholars, the judicial process was an entity apart from and superior 
to the administrative process; for Arnold, judicial and administrative processes were secondary 
to, and themselves merely part of, the regulatory project of New Deal governance.  One 
advocated a timeless, presumptively nonideological constitutional system without any necessary 
substantive end; the other championed a contingent, historically necessary and appropriate 
regulatory project that sought to respond to an economic and political crisis.  
A series of friendly exchanges between Frankfurter and Arnold in early 1936 that began 
in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Butler (1936) crystallized these 
opposing changes.227  The Court in Butler held that the processing tax at the core of the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 was an unconstitutional invasion of the reserved powers of 
the states and exceeded Congress’s taxing and spending authority under the general welfare 
227 Letter from Thurman Arnold to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 8, 1936, Thurman Wesley Arnold papers, American 
Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, at Box 9.
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clause.228  In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts declared that the “only” duty of the judicial 
branch when faced with an “appropriately challenged” act of Congress is “to lay the article of the 
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the 
latter squares with the former.”229  For Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo in 
dissent, the majority’s willingness to strike down a key portion of the Act in its entirety, in 
response to a suit by the receiver of an agriculture commodity processing company that owed 
taxes from previous years, ignored an essential “guiding principle” of constitutional adjudication: 
necessary and prudent judicial self-restraint in the face of efforts to seek constitutional 
invalidation of seemingly “unwise laws” should properly defer the power of repeal to “the 
ballot” and “the processes of democratic government.”230  Similarly, Walter Gellhorn, in his 1940 
casebook, would characterize Justice Roberts’s statement and approach to adjudication as one 
“made by the learned justice more for the delectation of the newspaper reading public than for 
the enlightenment of the profession,” and as akin to support for the issuance of advisory 
opinions.231
As a supporter of the New Deal, Arnold was opposed to the substance of the Court’s 
decision.232  But the majority’s willingness to consider the constitutionality of the entire statute 
was consistent with his desire for speedy and dramatic adjudication.  Tongue firmly in cheek, 
Arnold wrote Frankfurter two days after the decision was issued, saying that he “never dreamed” 
he would have such influence on the Court, and that he knew of no source other than his article 
“where the Court could find authority for making such a broad decision.”233  Frankfurter agreed, 
228 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
229 Id. at 62.
230 Id. at 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting).
231 GELLHORN, supra note 68, at 133.
232 See Thurman W. Arnold, Debate—Affirmative: Prof. Thurman W. Arnold, in NEW YORK STATE BAR 
ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 159, 162-63 (1936) (arguing against majority decision 
in Butler and in support of that part of Justice Stone’s dissent asserting the constitutionality of the A.A.A.).
233 Letter from Thurman Arnold to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 8, 1936 supra note 227.
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returning Arnold’s letter with a handwritten note characterizing him as a “prophet.”234  Three 
months later, after the Court issued its Carter Coal decision invalidating the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935 as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to fix hours and 
wages to certain coal producers and miners,235 Frankfurter sent Arnold a mocking telegram in 
which he complained that the decision 
convinces me that my devotion to ancient Supreme Court doctrine that the [] Court 
should confine itself to the case in the record is completely outmoded and should be 
abandoned by sound men everywhere.  Stop.  You were right.  Stop.  I was wrong.  Stop.  
And so [I] apply herewith for membership in your seminar where these inevitable judicial 
tendencies to spread opinions all over the map are explained with the aid of your almost 
uncanny penetration into judicial psychology.  Stop.  I am now a convert to your 
statesmenlike doctrine of contracting jurisprudence by enlarging it which is probably the 
best substitute that can be adopted for sociological jurisprudence in these curious times.236
Arnold apparently hoped that the Court’s occasional striking down New Deal legislation 
might establish a new, dramatic jurisprudential approach, that—no matter the substantive 
result—would be incidentally beneficial to legislators and agencies by speeding the validation of 
regulatory programs.  Frankfurter saw this and was appalled at the potential danger to the Court’s 
institutional prestige, even if the Court’s invalidation of key parts of the New Deal might lead to 
a political and popular upheaval in support of New Deal programs that the Court could not 
contain.  At minimum, Arnold embraced the long-term regulatory gains that would result from 
removing the uncertainty of piecemeal litigation, and he may even have enjoyed seeing, as 
Frankfurter suspected, the prospect of an administration he favored facing a wounded Court.  His 
was, in the end, a strategic litigator’s vision of administrative law that sought to utilize existing 
procedure to achieve a particular substantive result.  While Frankfurter supported the same 
substantive aspects of the New Deal, his attachment to a philosophical, normative, and systemic 
vision of legal process outweighed his politics.
234 Felix Frankfurter, undated annotations to Letter re: Butler, supra note 227.
235 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 238.
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IV.
The Administrative Process and the Legal Process Approach
The legal process Frankfurter and the first generation of administrative law scholars 
triumphed as a corollary to the administrative process foreshadowed the emergence, after World 
War II, of what became known as the legal process approach.  When they framed the proposed 
field of administrative law doctrine, research, and teaching as a matter of institutional design 
within a seamless system of law and governance, first generation scholars had laid groundwork 
for the intellectual ferment that followed.237  Frankfurter’s student and co-author, Henry Hart, 
would become one of the leading proponents of the legal process approach, as would many of 
Frankfurter’s other students at Harvard and Supreme Court clerks.238  Legal process came to 
dominate legal education in the post-war period; and today it remains a pervasive, if not quite 
predominant, characterization of governance and especially of the judiciary’s role within it.239  As 
it further developed the ideas of first generation administrative law scholars, the legal process 
approach came to shape the entirety of American post-war public law scholarship, providing 
both a legitimating set of procedural norms and practices for the growing administrative state and 
a flexible approach to the varied and changing purposes for which federal agencies would be 
236 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Thurman W. Arnold, May 22, 1936, Thurman Wesley Arnold papers, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, at Box 9.
237 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, at li, lxi-lxii (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994)[hereinafter Historical and Critical Introduction].  Let me be clear as to the limits of this relationship.  I am 
decidedly not arguing that the first generation administrative law scholarship of Frankfurter and Landis directly 
created the legal process approach, which focused largely on issues relating more directly to federal courts and 
jurisdiction.  Landis and especially Frankfurter were concerned with more practical and political matters than the 
post-war legal process scholars, whose work tended towards a much higher level of abstraction.  Rather, the earlier 
work was an important influence with somewhat different political motivations that operated within a distinct 
historical context.  See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 162, at ch. 9; Purcell, supra note 212, at 775 n.76.  
238 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 29, 259-59 n.35 (1996) [hereinafter 
STRANGE CAREER].
239 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994).
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used.240  This Part draws connections between the scholarship of pre-war administrative law 
theory and the post-war legal process approach, and argues that by both criticizing the 
emergence of a formal, systematic vision of administrative law and proposing a quite different 
set of relationships between courts and agencies, Arnold forecast the triumph of a process-
centered approach, and saw in advance that approach’s functional, conceptual, and political 
limits.
A. The Institutional Core of the Legal Process Approach.
Because first generation administrative law scholarship had focused on designing a 
system of judicial review that would enable the emergence of an optimal administrative process, 
they did not anticipate the entirety of the legal process paradigm.241  Briefly identifying the 
elements of the legal process approach, however, makes plain the historical connection between 
the two.  The legal process approach commanded that judges should rely on “reasoned 
elaboration” expressed in fulsome, consistent, and rational decisions;242 engage in a “maturing of 
collective thought” through the careful, incremental exercise of common law development;243 and 
ultimately create and protect a self-limiting judicial institution that performs those tasks in which 
it is competent.244
This latter assertion about institutional competence demonstrates the essential continuity 
between first generation administrative law scholarship and contemporary administrative law 
theory.  It rests on a presumption about the structural determination of governance, and states a 
commitment, both as a matter of theory and a matter of normative consequence, to a permanent 
240 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern 
Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1991).
241 For a useful summary of the range of embedded assumptions in the legal process approach, see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964-66 (1994). 
242 HART & SACKS, supra note 237, at 145-50.
243 Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 100 (1959).
244 HART & SACKS, supra note 237, at 696, 1009-11.
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allocation of decisionmaking within specific and appropriate institutions.245  In an article on 
criminal law, Henry Hart declared that institutional competence is “axiomatic,” insisting that 
“each agency of decision ought to make those decisions which its position in the institutional 
structure best fits it to make.”246  Settled institutional structures are “more fundamental than the 
substantive arrangements in the structure of a society,” Hart wrote with his co-author Albert 
Sacks, because they distribute decisionmaking among institutions, from the private ordering of 
the market to the interconnected institutions of government, and thereby serve as “the source of 
the substantive arrangements and the indispensable means of making them work more 
effectively.”247  The primary purpose of law’s core “constitutive or procedural understandings or 
arrangements” is to respect and protect institutional structures, which legal process adherents 
considered more fundamental than mere substantive arrangements because they—and only 
they—enable “well-informed and wise decisions” and optimal results.248
Thus, the legal process approach presumes the basic functionality of American 
representative democracy, and conceptualizes judicial review both as an “anomaly” that is duly 
constrained by attention to process issues and as the most effective and least dangerous bulwark 
to other institutions’ failure to operate within the bounds of constitutional order.249  In this regard, 
245 Eskridge & Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction, supra note 237, at xciv-xcvi.
246 Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 426.
247 HART & SACKS, supra note 237, at 154.
248 Id. at 3, 154.
249 See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory—And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 226-
28 (1981) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962)).  In the version most 
committed to a restrained, conservative judiciary, Legal Process saw the judicial institution serving as the “least 
dangerous branch” of government, one that could develop and use “neutral principles” of procedure and decision to 
resolve only those disputes it could competently and appropriately consider.  BICKEL, supra, at 58 (“Courts must act 
on true principles, capable of unremitting application.  When they cannot find such a principle, they are bound to 
declare the legislative choice valid.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1959) (defining the judicial role as employing “criteria that can be framed and tested as an 
exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will”); id. at 15 (declaring that “the main constituent of 
the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is 
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieve”).  
In all its modes, legal process sought objective principles of decision formation that would be applied 
within a competent, restrained judicial institution, and thereby presumed the possibility of a nonideological, 
pluralist, and democratic means of achieving and protecting the great American postwar consensus.  A blend of 
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the legal process approach operates less as a full-blown jurisprudential theory than, in Neil 
Duxbury’s words, “an attitude premissed on the belief that those who respect and exercise the 
faculty of reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori criteria which give sense and 
legitimacy to their legal activities.”250  Committed to a rather windy-seeming claims about the 
reason embedded in and produced by procedural formality, the legal process approach seems to 
stand in opposition to the overt anti-formalism of legal realism.  But it has appropriated many of 
realism’s tendencies and insights, including its focus on procedure and its recognition that the 
judiciary is an active agent of decisionmaking, an agency whose decisions make law rather than 
finding it.251  In doing so, however, it articulates realism’s lessons in distinct ways by focusing on 
systemic, rather than functional, ends.  Legal process adherents study procedure to develop and 
protect the judiciary’s institutional competence as appellate tribunals built upon reason, rather 
than to create detailed, functional procedural regimes.252  Like realists, legal process adherents 
diverge from the scientific naturalism of classical legal formalism.  Despite this commonality, 
however, legal process ultimately proposes a strict set of distinctions—between law and policy; 
between branches of government; and between principled reason and unprincipled, willful 
constitutional, normative, and functional presumptions of best and necessary political economic practices, legal 
process was legal academia’s contribution to the historic bloc of cold war liberal intellectuals, which included 
theories of pluralism in political science and consensus in American historiography.  See DUXBURY, supra note 99, 
at 242-51, 255-57; G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies:  A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 
SW. L.J. 819, 829 (1986).  For an overview of consensus in the mainstream of immediate post-war intellectual 
circles, see EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 257-58 (1973).  Cf.  ANDREW ROSS, NO 
RESPECT: INTELLECTUALS AND POPULAR CULTURE 55-56 (1989) (describing the formation of an “historic bloc” of 
liberal post-war intellectualism).  Most famously, postwar liberals declared “the end of ideology” and celebrated a 
political system “in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some 
crucial stage in the process of decision.”  DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960); ROBERT A. DAHL, A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137 (1956).
250 DUXBURY, supra note 99, at 208.  Cf. Brian Leiter, Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 367, 370-71 (1997) (reviewing DUXBURY, supra note 99) (rejecting Duxbury’s characterization of 
legal process, among other schools of modern American legal thought, as “jurisprudence” on the grounds that such 
movements are better considered as types of constitutional or political theory).
251 See DUXBURY, supra note 99, at 211 -12; G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: 
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 284-86 (1973)[hereinafter Evolution].
252 See White, Evolution, supra note 251, at 286.
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activism—that themselves constitute what Morton Horwitz has called an “institutional 
formalism.”253
The legal process approach’s institutional core and concern with structure echoes similar 
tendencies in first generation administrative law theory.  To make this connection even clearer, 
consider the relatively brief treatment that Henry Hart and Albert Sacks gave in their famous 
casebook materials254 to the place of administrative agencies within the legal process.255  They 
presumed a settled system in which, despite the “great variety” of administrative powers, “the 
dynamics of subsequent growth” in the “arrangement” of administrative regulation “follow a 
distinctive pattern.”256  Official responsibility for formulating policy, elaborating statutory 
authority, and developing methods of individual adjudication lies first in the administrative 
agency to which regulatory authority was generally delegated, no matter whether the legislation 
bestowed these specific powers on the agency or was silent.257  Its “first-line status” grants the 
agency the opportunity, without judicial assistance, to establish regulatory programs and 
adjudicatory arrangements on which regulated parties can rely, and to spare courts the burden of 
handling “the great mass of controversies” itself.258  “On appropriate challenge” to agency action 
or the underlying legislation itself, courts function as a “second-line” reviewing agency with the 
duty to determine the constitutionality of the statute and regulatory program, and whether the 
253 HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 254; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 75-77 (1995) 
(associating legal process school with classical legal formalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873, 895 (1987) (noting analogous approach of early twentieth century formalism with Wechsler’s use of legal 
process theory to critique the Warren Court).
254 The casebook materials—though never completed and officially published, they were widely adopted as 
mimeographed drafts—“provided the name, the agenda, and much of the analytical structure” for the legal process 
approach.  See Eskridge & Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction, supra note 237, at liii.
255 The materials treated administrative law and process only briefly on the assumption that students would 
consider the subject more thoroughly in an administrative law course.  See HART & SACKS, supra note 237, at 1060-
61. 
256 Id. at 165.
257 Id. at 165-66.
258 Id. at 1291.
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agency action was authorized by the statute.259  Viewed from the perspective of first generation 
administrative law scholars, legal process theory’s commitment to institutions and structures 
would appear quite familiar; and looking backward at the historical and thematic connections 
between the two, we can see more clearly the procedural core of early modern administrative 
law, with its pretensions of structural protection for the agencies and the more permanent and 
important judicial institutions.
B. Against Theology: Arnold, Henry Hart, and Judicial Process.
In 1960, at the legal process approach’s apogee, Thurman Arnold published a scathing 
attack on Henry Hart in the Harvard Law Review, responding to Hart’s criticism of what he 
deemed unreasoned and unprofessional opinions issued by certain members of the Warren 
Court.260  Using a fairly simple empirical method, Hart had complained that the Court was 
deciding too many cases too quickly,261 and as a result was issuing decisions that lacked “the 
underpinning of principle which is necessary to illumine large areas of the law and thus 
discharge the function which has to be discharged by the highest judicial tribunal of a nation 
dedicated to exemplifying the rule of law.”262  To prove his point, Hart provided a detailed 
exegesis of the Court’s recent grant of habeas corpus in Irvin v. Dodd,263 a decision in which the 
Court provided a “transparently indefensible reading [of the Indiana Supreme Court opinion 
denying the capital defendant’s appeal of his conviction due to a biased jury and improper 
prosecutorial conduct] in order to strike down jurisdictional barriers to the consideration of 
federal claims.”264  In this decision, and generally, the Court had failed to follow the proper legal 
259 Id. at 166-67.
260 See Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960) (responding to Henry 
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 
(1959)[hereinafter Time Chart]) [hereinafter Theology].
261 See Hart, Time Chart, supra note 260, at 85-94.
262 Id. at 99.
263 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
264 Hart, Time Chart, supra note 260, at 110.
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process that would “illumine large areas of the law” and establish “impersonal and durable 
principles of constitutional law.”265  Hart closed his jeremiad by warning that reason, and not 
merely a temporary majority of justices, is “the life of law,” and by claiming that such reason 
had been lost in the operations of the Warren Court.266
Arnold had left Yale and academia in 1938 for the Justice Department, and had since 
served briefly on the District of Columbia federal circuit court of appeals before establishing the 
private law firm that would become Arnold & Porter,267 but he felt strongly enough about his old 
nemesis’s criticism to defend in print a Court that included many of his own friends.268  After 
disagreeing with Hart’s close reading,269 Arnold dismissed his larger argument that the Court’s 
purportedly incompetent decisions failed to uphold the institution’s standard.  In the same critical 
voice he had wielded decades before, he argued that principles were not immutable, and that the 
operations of the Supreme Court, with its nine diverse members, often resulted in difficult 
decisions with fragile majorities—unlike the opinions of legal academics who Arnold believed 
used the limitless time available to them to propose platitudes and unworkable legal propositions 
in the Harvard Law Review.270  What is worse, Arnold alleged, Hart’s conception of the proper 
judicial process and the competent judicial institution had evolved into a new conservative 
formalism in which he and his cohorts criticized the Court on procedural and formal grounds in 
order to condemn the Court’s increasingly liberal tendencies.271
265 Id. at 99.
266 Id. at 125.
267 See VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 7, at 51-94.
268 See id. at 88. 
269 See Arnold, Theology, supra note 260, at 1304-10.  In an article that was otherwise supportive of Hart and 
critical of Arnold, even Hart’s dean, Erwin Griswold, found his analysis of Irvin lacking.  See Erwin N. Griswold, 
Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 83 (1960).
270 See Arnold, Theology, supra note 260, at 1312-14.
271 See id. at 1315-17.  The argument that legal process used procedural means to further conservative political 
commitments is fairly common.  See, e.g. Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 J. L. REFORM 560, 566 
(1988); Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT 557, 564-67 (1995); but see
KALMAN, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 238, at 30-36; Eskridge & Frickey, Historical and Cultural Introduction, 
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Here, in a somewhat changed but still recognizable form, was the complaint Arnold had 
lodged against Hart and his colleagues more than twenty years earlier—although he saw the 
Henry Hart of 1960 opponents as an unsympathetic associate of the conservative “corporate bar” 
rather than as a fellow New Deal advocate.272  Hart’s legal process approach, it seemed, had 
confirmed Arnold’s original suspicion that underneath the apparent New Deal advocacy of first 
generation administrative law scholars lurked a formalism as pernicious as that of Langdellian 
conservatives.  For Arnold in 1960 as in the mid-1930s, the fetish of process, institutions, and 
systems came at the expense of a frank consideration of substance.  Systems would not aid 
political efforts to improve the economy and society, any more than they had aided the New 
Deal; and the wider social benefits that would flow from these political movements, Arnold 
presumed, vastly outweighed any loss that would be incurred by an “unprincipled” Court or a 
non-systematic administrative law.  Law’s role was to further substantive aims, not to build and 
protect “reason” through procedural and institutional systems.  Arnold thereby anticipated 
arguments that critics from fields as diverse as Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies 
would later employ against the legal process approach.273
What Arnold saw as the “theology” of the mature legal process approach—which 
included, for Henry Hart, counting the hours and minutes justices spent on each decision to see if 
they had sufficiently enabled “the maturing of collective thought” in their deliberative 
processes274—was itself a culmination of the logical system whose coherence and consequences 
he had debated with Frankfurter.  Viewed as part of a larger movement in American legal 
academia, first generation administrative law scholarship was an early development in the 
supra note 237, at cvi-cxiii, cxx-cxxi (defending legal process proponents against charges that they opposed the 
Warren Court’s desegregation decisions and were latter-day formalists).
272 Arnold, Theology, supra note 260, at 1315.
273 For summaries of this criticism, see Eskridge & Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction, supra note 
237, at cxviii-cxxv; Edward L. Rubin, Commentary—The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1398-1402 (1996).
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building of a post-war, post-realist consensus around a particular vision of law and reason.  In 
terms of influencing legal doctrine and future scholarship, whether in the field of administrative 
law or in legal doctrines and legal academia generally, Arnold lost that debate badly.  But, as the 
next Part argues, aspects of his critique continue both to resonate in contemporary scholarship 
and to explain the idiosyncratic dynamics of administrative law.
V.
Regulatory Frustration and the Recurring Crisis of the “Logical System”
The approach offered by first generation administrative law scholars and challenged by 
Arnold successfully established a long-lasting conceptual system to understand the role of law 
and legal institutions in the administrative state.  Its concerns with administrative discretion and 
judicial review continue to structure and suffuse the curriculum of administrative law courses 
and remain at the core of administrative law scholarship.  At the same time, the field regularly 
suffers through periods of crisis and self-examination, due in part to external political pressures 
placed on administrative agencies and their regulatory practices and to the insights of 
interdisciplinary scholarship that test some of administrative law’s foundations.  This Part 
suggests that most legal academic challenges to the legitimacy and regulatory practices of 
administrative agencies and to the way in which the subject is studied and taught arise from 
within the dynamic of institutional competence and judicial review that was found and furthered 
by first generation scholars.  Moreover, the frustration that these challenges represent is often 
resolved—to the extent that it is resolved at all—within the same dynamic.  To challenge the 
dynamic itself—as some recent scholarship is doing—is to return, in a sense, to Arnold’s project: 
resist or disrupt the presumptions of a comprehensive logical system built upon procedure and 
embrace instead an explicit substantive project of optimal regulatory practices.
274 See Hart, supra note 260, at 86, 94, 100.
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As much epilogue as argument, this Part does not offer a solution to the cycle of 
regulatory frustrations that administrative law’s logical system generates.  Instead, it draws 
connections between the system as it was identified by first generation scholars and as it 
currently exists.  Looking first at continuity across time in administrative law scholarship, I argue 
that even though early scholars lost their arguably blind faith in agencies during the post-war 
period, they nevertheless remained in thrall to the logical system they had developed.  Second, I 
describe the continuity between current and early administrative law casebooks, identifying 
themes and structures that continue to dominate the classroom.  Finally, I identify continuities 
between Arnold’s opposition to that system and contemporary scholars’ dissent to the current 
doctrines and practices of administrative law.  This historical continuity confirms Arnold’s 
insights regarding both the symbolic core of administrative law’s logical system, and the limits 
that core places on how, and how much, any effort to reconfigure the system can succeed. 
A. Systemic Continuity.
To claim historical continuity between the administrative law theory of the mid-1930s 
and that of seventy years later seems absurd on its face.  The intervening decades have witnessed 
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act; a vast expansion of the number, type, and province 
of regulatory agencies; wide recognition of the administrative state’s legal legitimacy; and, over 
the past three decades, recurrent calls for the dismantling of the federal regulatory apparatus.275
But at the same time, viewed from the abstract level of the logical system that first generation 
administrative law scholars advocated, the field has been remarkably settled.  A recent definition 
of administrative law by one of the field’s most important academics would look quite familiar 
to scholars of the 1930s:
[Administrative] law defines the structural position of administrative agencies within the 
governmental system, specifies the decisional procedures those agencies must follow, and 
275 For an overview of this history, see Rabin, Historical Perspective, supra note 3, at 1262-1315.
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determines the availability and scope of review of their actions by the independent 
judiciary.  It furnishes common principles and procedures that cut horizontally across the 
many different substantive fields of administration and regulation.276
Administrative law scholarship has often claimed to be breaking free of its early 
moorings.  Even three of the most vocal proponents of administrative agencies during the New 
Deal, then-Justice Frankfurter and his former students Louis Jaffe and James Landis, seemed to 
abandon their faith in administrative agencies in the decades following World War II and to 
require or call for more thorough external checks on agencies’ regulatory discretion.277  Their 
movements culminated in Frankfurter’s 1951 opinion in NLRB v. Universal Camera—which 
recognized a political “mood” established by Congress that sought enhanced judicial review278—
in the law review articles that resulted in Jaffe’s 1965 book Judicial Control of Administrative 
Action—which denounced judicial “self-deprecation and abdication” of agency oversight279—and 
in Landis’s 1960 report to President-Elect Kennedy proposing means to increase Executive 
control over the federal regulatory bureaucracy.280  In their distrust of agencies and their newly 
developed faith in judicial and other external checks on agency discretion, they and others in the 
post-war period emphasized that, in Jaffe’s words, “[t]he availability of judicial review is the 
necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which 
276 Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV 437, 438 (2003).
277 See HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 235-40.  The precise periodization of this shift is the subject of some 
dispute.  But whether this shift occurred immediately following World War II, over the course of the first two 
decades after the war, or later, is largely irrelevant for purposes of my argument.  See Thomas Merrill, Capture 
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997) (asserting that the shift away from New 
Deal-era deference to agencies occurred in the 1970s); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law:  An Essay on the 
Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1997) 
(asserting that the shift occurred in the 1950s and 1960s); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: 
World War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME 
FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 185 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002) (asserting that the shift began immediately
following World War II).
278 374 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act’s language requiring the NLRB’s findings of 
fact to be supported “by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole” standard for the support 
“expressed a mood” in Congress away from legislative presumptions of agency expertise and judicial deference).
279 LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 344 (1965).
280 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) (written by James 
M. Landis) [hereinafter LANDIS REPORT].
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purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”281  Indeed, Jaffe went so far as practically to denounce 
Landis and The Administrative Process in an article published after Landis’s death, where he 
argued that the hopes placed by New Deal advocates in administrative expertise and large federal 
regulatory agencies could only last as long as the New Deal’s historical peculiarity.282  Similarly, 
in his report to Kennedy, Landis famously expressed his own frustration with the administrative 
state by excoriating regulatory agency performance and by proposing significant reforms, 
including greater Presidential oversight.283  Within twenty-five years of leading the effort to 
establish a modern vision of administrative law, these stalwarts of the first generation seemed to 
repudiate their earlier conceptions of the administrative process.
But Arnold’s critique of the “logical system” these first generation figures advocated 
demonstrates that although they may have lost faith in what they perceived to be the excesses of 
the New Deal regulatory state, they presumed the stability of an underlying system of 
administrative law and process.  Unlike Arnold, first generation scholars did not want to dispense 
with judicial review and, despite their abiding faith in agency expertise, they constructed a 
system of institutional tasks and competencies that included loose but still-prevalent checks and 
balances.284  As I explained above, even Landis, in a book that enthusiastically advocated 
regulation and the administrative state, supported a continuing and central role in the 
administrative process for judicial review.285
When their early work is remembered correctly, their later work does not appear to mark 
a loss of faith in the administrative process.  Justice Frankfurter’s decisions continued to focus on 
281 JAFFE, supra note 279, at 320.
282 See Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 321-24 (1964)
283 See LANDIS REPORT, supra note 280; see generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 206-
07; 219-21 (1984) (discussing LANDIS REPORT, supra).
284 See text accompanying supra notes 49-55.  Cf. John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive 
Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1114-17 (2000) 
(characterizing New Deal supporters like Landis as embracing vision of unfettered agencies). 
285 See text accompanying supra notes 88-90.
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jurisdictional issues that restrained judicial intervention into the administrative process,286 while 
his opinion in Universal Camera merely sought to reflect and implement a change in legislative 
direction, and thereby to enforce the wishes of the legislative institution.287  As a justice, his 
administrative law decisions sought to strike a balance between the integrity of the 
administrative process and the integrity of the lower federal courts.288  Jaffe himself noted in an 
analysis of Frankfurter’s judicial decisions on administrative law that the jurist’s “point of view” 
towards the field that he developed as an academic did not alter in its generalities, though its 
specific doctrinal patterns became “less pronounced [and] their application more flexible.”289
Frankfurter’s disciples shared his views.  Jaffe did not seek a radical change to the 
administrative process or the field of administrative law in the 1950s; instead, he suggested that 
faith in the absolute and necessary expertise of agencies was misplaced, and although no formula 
could perfectly check administrative discretion, judicial review was especially important “to curb 
and correct administrative distortion, to substitute the broad for the narrow view.”290  Nor did 
Landis’s report present a radically different vision of the dynamics of administrative law, despite 
his greatly increased suspicion of administrative discretion.291  Rather, he proposed incremental 
structural solutions to increase presidential oversight and efforts to recruit better agency 
personnel.292  The logical system Frankfurter, Landis, and Jaffe advocated was sufficiently 
flexible to allow them to remain committed to its dynamic, even as they advocated adjustments 
to its precise workings.  If agencies were less expert and objective than they had previously 
286 See Bernard Schwartz, The Administrative World of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 59 YALE L.J. 1228, 1256 
(1950).
287 For a thorough analysis of how Universal Camera fits within Frankfurter’s evolving but consistent theory 
of administrative law, see Alfred S. Neely, Justice Frankfurter, Universal Camera and a Jurisprudence of Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
288 See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J. 240, 264 
(1957).
289 Louis L. Jaffe, Adventures in Administrative Law, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 206, 206 (Wallace 
Mendelson ed., 1964).
290 JAFFE, supra note 279, at 26.
291 See LANDIS REPORT, supra note 280, at 1-3.
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appeared to the leaders of the first generation, then other competent institutions, particularly the 
judiciary, could reform agency procedure and organization by tightening the reins and 
heightening their scrutiny of agencies—all without calling the system itself into question.
In their structure and focus, contemporary administrative law casebooks show a similar 
continuity.  They are not significantly distinct from the first great modern administrative law 
casebook, Walter Gellhorn’s first text (published in 1940), which moved from early chapters 
introducing the administrative state through the structural constitutional issues of the separation 
and delegation of powers.  It spent the bulk of its time discussing common law and pre-APA 
statutory efforts to define fair administrative procedures before concluding with judicial control 
over administrative determination.293  Although sprinkled with significant amounts of 
commentary on constitutional issues (including an extended excerpt from an Arnold article on 
the symbolic differences between judges and bureaucrats), the Gellhorn casebook used a 
traditional case- and court-centered approach.294  Contemporary casebooks—even when they 
present significant amounts of theoretical and substantive background material in an introductory 
chapter to orient students to the administrative process—continue to take a court-centered 
approach that revolves around the role of judicial review and relies upon appellate decisions to 
illustrate and explain the relative institutional roles of administrative agencies and the three 
governmental branches.295  They still focus as well on procedural issues and on administrative 
292 See id. at 66-68, 83-87.
293 See GELLHORN, supra note 68.
294 See id. at 147-52 (excerpting Arnold, Role, supra note 211, at 624-31).
295 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2002) 
(presenting materials in three parts: “Institutional Framework,” with one chapter on the nature and functions of 
agencies and two chapters on judicial review; “Administrative Functions,” with chapters on policy formation, 
adjudication, enforcement, and licensing; and “Indirect Controls,” with chapters on liability and public access); 
JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003) (following an 
extended introduction to administrative law, separate chapters focusing on how the legislature and executive 
supervise agencies, how agencies adjudicate, make rules, and gather and disperse information, and then how courts 
review suits to challenge administrative action); STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 70 (following an introduction to 
administrative law and a chapter on agencies’ position within the “structural constitution,” four chapters on 
administrative procedure and open government, and then three chapters on judicial review).  
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discretion.296  The most significant departure from the current pedagogical norm are casebooks 
that focus separately on administrative procedure in certain specific areas of substantive 
regulation and emphasize more clearly the nature and purpose of agencies’ regulatory mandates.  
But they largely reconfigure the traditional emphasis on judicial review by considering it on an 
agency-by-agency basis, and by bracketing the substantive regulatory material in discrete, early 
sections.297  Thus, the substance and pedagogy of the academic field reveals the extent to which 
the institution- and procedure-focused approach of first generation scholarship remains 
dominant.
B. The Continuity of Crisis and Dissent.
As it appears in casebooks, administrative law today may look relatively similar to the 
field as it emerged from the 1930s, but continuity should not be mistaken for theoretical 
ossification.  As I noted in the Introduction, administrative law as a body of doctrine and an 
academic field has faced recurring political crises over allegations that agencies impose unfair or 
inefficient regulatory practices, are subject to capture by regulated industries or public interest 
groups, or are simply incompetent.298  As the first generation scholars themselves demonstrated 
during the 1950s, these bouts of frustration have forced the field to rethink at least some of its 
assumptions about agency discretion and judicial review.  To what extent have these crises 
affected the foundations of administrative law as they were established by the field’s first 
generation?
296 See, e.g., STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 70, at iv (describing administrative law course and casebook as a 
body of judicially reviewable procedural requirements and concerns with efforts to control administration by the 
separate spheres of government).
297 See, e.g., BREYER ET AL., supra note 4 (including an extensive introduction to regulation and focus on 
regulatory substance and individual agencies, and including extensive section on alternatives to agency-based 
regulation; but also focusing ultimately on judicial review and on using appellate decisions for teaching materials); 
see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal 
Development, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 268 (special issue 1990) (noting limits of these casebooks’ dissent from 
procedure- and structure-obsession of administrative law teaching and theory because of their failure to explain how 
substantive-specific procedure is generated and sustained).
298 See, supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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Consider first an especially well-known instance of a scholar identifying a particular 
crisis and its resolution: Richard Stewart’s important article in 1975 noting the breakdown of 
what he termed the “traditional model” of judicial review and formal procedures, and the 
emergence of a largely court-imposed, pluralist model of administrative process in which 
agencies are required to consider a fair representation of affected interests in their rulemaking 
procedures.299  Viewed from Arnold’s perspective, new, additional procedural requirements did 
not shake the foundations of administrative law.  Interest representation, and related statutory 
efforts to open the records and meetings of the administrative process that became law in the 
1960s and 1970s,300 are procedural fixes to political legitimacy crises, imposing statutory rights 
and common law changes on administrative procedures without directly affecting the systematic 
logic of the administrative state.  Although they may have complicated and inhibited agency 
operations and judicial review,301 representation and participation have not significantly 
diminished administrative law’s faith in procedure, institutional competencies, and legal-
centrism—indeed, they have reinforced the assumption that procedural requirements placed upon 
agencies and enforced by judicial review lead to better substantive policy.
Some contemporary critics, however, have suggested more radical changes—changes 
that, by moving away from traditional conceptions of administrative law as doctrine and 
299 See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 2, at 1669, 1670, 1675.  Nevertheless, as he noted, each model shared 
“a common social value in legitimating, through controlling rules and procedures, the exercise of power over private 
interests by officials not otherwise formally accountable.”  Id. at 1671.
300 These include the statute imposing record disclosure requirements on agencies, the Freedom of Information 
Act (which became law in 1966 and was the subject of important amendments in 1974), and the statute imposing 
open meeting requirements, the Government in the Sunshine Act, which became law in 1976, and the statute 
imposing access requirements in advisory committees formed by federal agencies, the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, which became law in 1972.  See The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-497, 80 Stat. 250 (1966); 
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974); The 
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976); The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. I.
301 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency 
Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 217-36 (1997); Reuel Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Policy: 
Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1389, 1450-52 (2000).
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academic field, resemble Arnold’s critique of the procedural and conceptual core of first 
generation scholarship.  A small sampling of such criticism reveals their parallels to Arnold’s 
earlier dissent.  As a system, some critics argue, administrative law is fatally flawed.  It is 
excessively adversarial and legalistic in its approach to regulation, and thereby imposes 
unnecessary, and otherwise avoidable, social and economic costs to the regulatory process.302  Its 
focus on judicial review invites interference in the administrative, and especially the rulemaking, 
process.303  It is based on a premodern sensibility and understanding of the administrative state as 
quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative, and thereby misunderstands and impedes modern, 
instrumentally rational agency operations.304  And with its hierarchical, tightly structured system,
it cannot reckon with the role private entities increasingly play in public governance and the 
opportunities that this role offers for interdependent relationships between private and public 
realms.305  Similar criticism condemns administrative law as an academic field for its excessive 
focus on the judiciary, which renders it unable to consider the extent to which internal 
administrative processes operate outside the control of judicial review,306 as well as for its related 
failure to develop a theory of regulation that can account for the dynamics of regulatory practice 
302 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 198-206 (2001).
303 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 
(1999) (arguing that judicial review of administrative rulemaking is both unwise and likely unconstitutional); Martin 
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 478-79 (1986) (warning against powerful judicial review 
because it discourages agency discretion and empowers judges to perform economic due process review of agency 
rulemaking).
304 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 95, 189-90 (2003); see also EDLEY, supra note 2 (complaining of the outdated judicial control of 
administrative agencies that arises from a “trichotomy” of adjudicative fairness, scientific expertise, and politics that 
correspond with judicial, executive, and legislative institutions and that manifests itself in conceptual failings, 
incoherence, and poor governance).
305 See Freeman, supra note 2, at 545-50.
306 See, e.g., MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 8 (noting that in the context of social security 
disability claims, the traditional conception of judicial review’s role in administrative law is descriptively false, as 
most claims are considered and resolved internally and without judicial oversight or appeal); Rabin, Transition, 
supra note 2, at 126-28, 132, 144-45 (criticizing traditional administrative law approach for its judicial-centric 
approach that fails to consider the important internal administrative practices that affect the consequences of 
substantive regulatory programs).
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and policy formation.307  Finally, the entire growing body of literature applying public choice and 
positive political theory to administrative agencies challenges the naiveté of first generation 
scholarship.  Far from a logical system of competent institutions with sufficient internal checks 
to protect the rule of law, public choice scholars argue, the administrative state is composed 
largely of self-interested actors seeking to maximize individual and institutional capital.308  And 
far from being reasoned objective means to control discretion and legitimate agency action, 
positive political theory scholars tell us, administrative procedures are merely means by which 
legislators protect their own political interests and those private interests they represent.309
These are inherently functional critiques, asserting that no matter the symbolic value of a 
system built on conceptions of pre-constituted, legitimating procedures and institutions, what 
may have once appeared to be a logical system now obstructs the administrative state from either 
achieving the goals set out by its political masters or realizing the potential benefits of its expert 
bureaucracy.  Not all of these critics propose radical reform—indeed some, like first generation 
scholars who sought to reform the system in the 1950s, would merely rejigger judicial standards 
of review310—but all challenge what first generation scholars took as an article of faith, namely 
that administrative law is concerned with designing legal and administrative processes that lead, 
inexorably, to legitimate and optimal regulatory results.  They represent a trend towards focusing 
307 See Steven Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 6 (1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics—and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE 
L.J. 341, 347 (1988); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1670-71 n.5.
308 The public choice literature is vast.  For an excellent summary and critique, see Croley, supra note 307, at 
34-56.
309 See Matthew McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:  Administrative Arrangements 
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.431 (1989); McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). 
310 See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 2, at 230-34 (calling for courts to review agency decisions based on norms of 
“sound governance”); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited:  Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 393, 445 (2000) (advocating partnership model of judiciary-agency relationship rather than hard look 
review of administrative rulemaking, but casting such partnership as “comparable to the professor’s review of a 
major research paper” in which the reviewer is “demanding” and “prepared to make difficult judgments,” but with 
the ultimate shared if creating “a well-reasoned product”); Shapiro, supra note 303, at 467, 491 (calling for broader 
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on substantive consequence, rather than system, procedure, and form.311  As such, these criticisms 
echo frustrations that Arnold first voiced, frustrations regarding how the first generation scholars 
conceived of the administrative state, as well as whether and how administrative law could 
legitimate and tame agencies.  Reconsidering Arnold and the foundational efforts of first 
generation scholarship enables a clearer picture of the difficulties and stakes of administrative 
law reform.
Conclusion
In 1935, Arnold quipped that administrative law provided a “Redeemer” for the modern 
state in the guise of a logical system;312 in the intervening years, it has served that purpose for 
law professors who revere, obsess over, and complain about its emphasis on procedure, 
institutional competencies, and judicial review.  Arnold correctly predicted both the success of 
that emphasis and the frustrations it would create.  The failure of his proposals, which offered no 
logical system or symbolic substance to attract and inspire the field, also proves his point.  It is a 
point worthy of consideration for contemporary efforts to reform administrative law in order to 
achieve substantive, normative ends:  Administrative law needs its legitimating symbols, its 
logical systems.  To forget or neglect that is to court failure.313
agency discretion and less judicial imposition of requirement that agencies engage in “synoptic” decision-making 
processes).
311 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 957 
(1997) (“Administrative law scholarship has acquired . . . a more substantive, a more economic, and a more 
institutional cast. There is much more interest in what works, and much less in the forms and formalities of the 
administrative process except insofar as they shape consequences in the real world.”).
312 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 1, at 64.
313 For an especially entertaining and depressing description of reformers failure to grasp this, see Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform:  Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative 
Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405 (1996).
